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THE CHIEF OR THE COURT: ARTICLE II AND THE APPOINTMENT OF
INFERIOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS
By James E. Pfander ∗
Each year, the Chief Justice of the United States makes a variety of
appointments to offices in the Article III bureaucracy, filling positions high and
low. 1 In 2011, for example, Chief Justice John G. Roberts participated in the
appointment of a new director of the Federal Judicial Center, the research and
teaching arm of the federal judiciary. 2 And with the 2011 retirement of the head of
∗

Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. Copyright
2012. For helpful suggestions, my thanks to the Florida International and Northwestern
University faculty workshops, the constitutional law colloquium at Loyola law school,
Steve Calabresi, Ted Ruger, John McGinnis, Judith Resnik, Long Truong, and Howard
Wasserman. For expert research assistance, my thanks to Anna Fodor and Sofia Vickery.
1 In recent years, the role of the Chief Justice as the judiciary’s administrator in chief has
attracted growing scholarly attention. Early contributions include Theodore W. Ruger, The
Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 341 (2005)
(detailing the wide-ranging appointment power of the Chief) [hereinafter Ruger,
Appointment Power]. For a sense of the literature, see Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg,
Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief
Justice of the United States, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1575 (2006) (exploring the Chief’s various
powers and questioning whether they should vest in a single Justice or be shared);
Theodore W. Ruger, The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial
Power, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1551 (2006); Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical Perspective, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 239
(2007) (analyzing the Chief’s appointments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) Court) [hereinafter, Ruger, FISA]; A variety of factors contribute to the interest.
For starters, scholars often view the judicial behavior of federal judges in general and the
Chief in particular as an outgrowth of their political views. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold
J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (1993). Scholars devoted to the
attitudinal model may find a political undertone to the exercise of the Chief’s appointment
powers. Moreover, scholars have suggested that Justices may time their retirements to
ensure that a president of their own party will choose their successor. See, e.g., Paul D.
Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An Introduction, in
Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices 3, 7 (Paul Carrington and
Roger Cramton eds., 2006) (raising the prospect of strategic retirement in support of term
limits for federal judges); cf. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The
Case for a “Golden Parachute”, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1397, 1432-36 (2005) (collecting
evidence that tends to refute the strategic retirement thesis). To the extent the strategic
retirement thesis explains the behavior of Chief Justices, critics may worry that the Chief’s
administrative powers will remain in one party’s hands for the foreseeable future.
2 Created in 1967, the Federal Judicial Center operates under the direction of a board of
directors. The Judicial Conference elects the members of the board from federal judges
serving in the circuit, district, bankruptcy and magistrate ranks; the Chief Justice serves as
the chair. See 28 U.S.C. 621. For a history of the FJC, see Denise L. Arial, History of the
Federal
Judiciary:
The
Federal
Judicial
Center,
http://
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the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Chief Justice bore sole
responsibility for the appointment of a successor. 3 Apart from these bureaucratic
figures, the Chief Justice also selects the judges, magistrates, and bankruptcy
judges who serve on the various committees of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the policy-making body of the federal judiciary over which he
presides at bi-annual meetings. 4 Finally, the Chief chooses sitting judges to staff
specialty courts, such as the courts established in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). 5 Whatever their influence on the resolution of the cases
that come before specialized courts, the Chief’s appointment powers may give him
a significant hand in the development of judicial branch policy. 6
Despite the familiarity of the practice, the power of Congress to vest the
Chief with appointment authority poses a constitutional puzzle. After setting a
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_18.html. The FJC Board selected Judge
Jeremy D. Fogel as its director effective October 2011.
3 The Administrative Office of the United States Court was established in 1939 as the
administrative arm of the federal judiciary. For an account of the AO’s origins, see Peter
Graham Fish, Crises, Politics, and Federal Judicial Reform: The Administrative Office Act
of 1939, 32 J. Pol. 599 (1970); for a critique of the judicial bureaucracy, see Judith Resnik,
Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 Harv.
L. Rev. 924 (2000) (questioning the bureaucratic role of life-tenured judges and their
influence on the legislative process). Federal law assigns the power to appoint and remove
the director of the AO to the Chief Justice. See 28 U.S.C 601 (vesting in the Chief Justice
the power to appoint and remove the Director and Deputy Director of the AO, “after
consulting with the Judicial Conference”). Chief Justice Roberts selected Thomas Hogan,
a senior federal district judge from the District of Columbia, as the AO’s new director
effective October 2011. See New Director of AO Appointed, The Third Branch (Oct.
2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-1001/New_Director_of_AO_Appointed.aspx.
4 On the origins and current structure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, see
infra note .
5 See infra note _.
6
For accounts of the changing make-up of the civil rules advisory committee, from one
initially comprised of lawyers and law professors to one now dominated by judges, see
Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1677, 1714-26 (2004) (assessing scholarship that models the rule-making
process from a public choice perspective). For an evaluation of the Chief Justice’s use of
the appointment power to influence the politics of civil justice reform within the Article III
judiciary, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking:
Errors of Scope, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 529, 614-23 (2001) (providing a case study of civil justice
reform that highlights the Chief’s influence on the process). On the way assignment power
can be used as a lever to influence outcomes, see J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling
(In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. Leg. Stud. 721, 724-28 (1994)
(examining the use of the assignment power to influence the way judges decide cases in
Japan).
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default rule of Presidential nomination and appointment, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, Article II empowers Congress to vest the appointment
of “inferior” officers in the president acting alone, in the heads of departments, and
in the “Courts of Law.” 7 Notably, Article II makes no provision for the
assignment of appointment authority to the Chief Justice, notwithstanding the fact
that the Constitution elsewhere recognizes the existence of that official (in the
provision that calls for the Chief to preside at the Senate’s trial of presidential
impeachments). So long as the judicial branch offices in question qualify as
“inferior” within the meaning of Article II, the Constitution appears to foreclose
the vesting of appointment authority in the Chief and to require its vesting in the
Court instead. 8
Although scholars have criticized modern appointment practices in the
judicial branch, the scholarly consensus holds that the vesting of appointment
authority in the Chief does not violate the Constitution. In the leading assessment
of the Chief’s appointment power, Professor Theodore Ruger concludes that the
practice is not “unconstitutional” in the modern sense that a federal court should
invalidate legislation conveying such power.9 He bases this conclusion on a
variety of considerations, including the gradual growth in the powers of the Chief
over time and the plausible textual case for treating the “court of law” as
synonymous with the Chief Justice of that court. As Professor Ruger notes, district
courts in the nineteenth century often employed a single district judge, making the

7

U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For a selection of the vast literature on the separation of
powers and the role of the appointment clause, see Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S.
Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH
(2008) (tracing the exercise of presidential power over time to assess its consistency with
the unitary executive thesis); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1639 (2010) (arguing against the use of presumptions in
resolving disputes over the separation of power); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994)
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan E. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or
Separation of Personnel, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1994).
8 As we shall see, early practice at the Supreme Court makes clear that judicial clerks are to
be regarded as inferior officers within the meaning of this provision. See infra text
accompanying notes ; see also Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 243 (1839) (treating
district court clerk as an inferior officer). The Court itself has held that special judges
appointed to serve on the Tax Court qualify as inferior officers, rather than employees. See
Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
9 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 351, 367-70.

Court-Based Appointment of Inferior Officers

4

“court” and the “judge” one and the same. 10 Ruger also points to Freytag v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 11 which upheld the power of the chief judge of
the Tax Court to appoint inferior officers to serve as special judges on that court.
Although the Court divided on one interpretive issue, 12 Ruger notes that neither
side questioned the exercise of the appointing authority by the chief judge of the
Tax Court rather than by the court itself. 13 Professor Ruger’s analysis may have
helped to persuade Professor Resnik that the Chief Justice’s appointment powers
were, as she and Lane Dilg concluded, unwise, but not unconstitutional.14
In this Essay, I explore the possibility that, notwithstanding scholarly
consensus and entrenched practice, the text of the Constitution may well mean
what it says in authorizing the Court but not the Chief Justice to serve as an
approved recipient of the power to appoint inferior officers. There are two reasons
to believe this might be so, one historical and one structural. As for history, the
evidence suggests that the decision to authorize the assignment of appointment
power to the courts, instead of the judges who staff them, may have been part of a
wide-ranging effort during the early republic to re-think the nature and perquisites
of judicial office.15 Throughout the eighteenth century, judicial officers earned
income from salary, from fees paid by litigants who appeared before the court, and
from the sale of inferior offices within the “gift” or patronage power of the judge.16
Non-salary perquisites grew controversial during the run up to the Revolution, as
10 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 369 (treating the reference to “courts of
law” as a distinction without a difference in light of the practice of staffing district courts
with a single judge).
11 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
12 As Ruger observes, the debate in Freytag focused on the majority’s conclusion that
Congress could invest the non-Article III Tax Court with the appointment power; the
concurring opinion of Justice Scalia argued that Article III courts alone could be given such
power. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia would have upheld the appointments by envisioning the
Tax Court as the head of an executive department. See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal
Rev., 501 U.S. 868, 918 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13 Perhaps the Justices’ awareness of their own Chief’s appointing role (and their
reluctance to cast doubt on its propriety) helped to generate the unarticulated consensus.
14 See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1619 n.188.
15 See James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the
Early Republic, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2008) (finding that by 1787, frustration and
criticisms of fee-based judicial compensation had resulted in state statutes and
constitutional provisions addressing the matter) [hereinafter Pfander, Judicial
Compensation].
16 See infra text accompanying notes __. For an account, see Daniel Duman, The Judicial
Bench in England 1727-1875: The Reshaping of a Professional Elite (1982). A tabular
presentation of the value of office sales in England, drawn from Duman’s work, appears
below at p. __.
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the colonists chafed under the burden of multiple fee-paid offices. 17 Among the
more colorful indictments in the Declaration of Independence was its claim that the
Crown “has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers
to harrass our people, and eat out their substance.” 18
Earlier work contends that Article III may have presumptively foreclosed
the practice of allowing federal judges to collect fees from the litigants who
appeared before the federal courts. 19 Article II may complement the no-fees
assumptions of Article III 20 by adding a no-office-sales proviso that prevents
judges from securing additional compensation through the exercise of patronage
power over appointments to inferior offices. By providing for Congress to vest the
appointment power in courts, the framers of Article II neatly clarified that the act
of appointment was to be a transparent part of the public work of the court. By
depriving the chief or any individual judge of the appointment power, moreover,
the provision may have signaled a desire to foreclose the sale of inferior office for
private gain. As was the case with the early implementation of the compensation
provisions of Article III, which featured a move away from fee-paid
compensation, 21 Congress implemented the Article II limitation in the Judiciary
Act of 1789 by assigning appointment powers to courts rather than judges in
keeping with this new conception of the judicial office as a public trust.22 Early

17

In addition to salary, colonial governors could earn substantial, additional income from
judicial and administrative fees. Lower officeholders often received fee payments as well
from sources such as marriage fees and liquor license fees. See Pfander, Judicial
Compensation, supra note 15, at 8-9 n. 34-37.
18 Decl. of Indep., para. 12 (U.S. 1776). For an account, see Edward Dumbauld, The
Declaration of Independence and What It Means Today 115-117 (1950) (detailing the
British government’s creation of new courts of admiralty and commissioners of customs in
the colonies, the fees they were paid, and the subsequent colonial protests that inspired the
indictment).
19 See Pfander, Judicial Compensation, supra note 15.
20 See id. at 15-10 n. 73-91 (offering textual and historical evidence that Article III
precludes fee-based compensation and recounting an exchange between Gouverneur
Morris and James Madison at the Constitutional Convention that appears to assume salarybased judicial compensation).
21 See id. at 24-26 (discussing the absence of judicial fee-based compensation provisions in
the Compensation and Process Acts of 1789; the Act specifically allowed for fee-based
compensation for clerks and marshals and excluded “fees to judges” from state fees to
federal court personnel, but the Act did incorporate fees of state courts in equity, admiralty,
and maritime cases).
22
See infra p. 17. See also Karen Orren, The Work of Government: Recovering the
Discourse of Office in Marbury v. Madison, 8 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 60 (1994)(recounting
changes in the conception of office as property that began during the early republic);
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practice, overseen by the nation’s first Chief Justice, John Jay, confirms the
perceived importance of court-based appointments. 23
The structural argument complements the historical evidence. Article III
creates a single supreme court, places it atop the federal judicial hierarchy, and
requires all other courts and tribunals erected or appointed by Congress to remain
inferior to that court. As noted elsewhere, the related requirements of unity,
supremacy, and inferiority together suggest that the Court must retain the power to
oversee the work of the judicial system. 24 These powers of oversight may extend
to state courts, when constituted as tribunals within the meaning of Article I, 25 to
federal agencies exercising judicial power, 26 and to lower federal courts, 27 and may
well encompass a power to review lower court decisions in the wake of
congressional restrictions on the Court’s as-of-right appellate jurisdiction. 28 Under
Article III, the Court bears ultimate responsibility for the way in which the judicial
department exercises the judicial power of the United States.29

23

See infra text accompanying notes _.
See James E. Pfander, ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (2009) (making a general argument that all federal
tribunals must remain inferior to the Supreme Court and subject to its oversight and
control); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1613 (2011) (exploring the Scottish antecedents to the hierarchical
features of the Article III judiciary);
25 James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality
of Jurisdiction Stripping, 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 191 (2007) (arguing that the Court’s
supremacy operates in relation to state courts) [hereinafter Pfander, Federal Supremacy].
26 James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (2004) (arguing that Article I tribunals must remain
inferior to the federal judiciary and ultimately to the Supreme Court) [hereinafter Pfander,
Article I Tribunals].
27 James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise
Inferior Tribunals, 78 Texas L. Rev. 1433 (2000).
28
See Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 26 at 237 (arguing that as a result of
jurisdiction-stripping legislation that denies inferior federal courts jurisdiction over specific
federal claims, state courts technically become federal tribunals with original jurisdiction
subject to Supreme Court oversight); see also Pfander & Birk, supra note 24, at 1622
(exploring the growing view that Congress may alter the Court’s as-of-right appellate
jurisdiction but may not “deprive the Court of the discretionary oversight that inheres in its
supremacy”).
29 The Court’s own decisions offer important support for this conception of the Court as the
final exponent of the judicial department’s exercise of judicial power. See Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (holding that Congress violated the
Constitution’s separation of powers when requiring federal courts to reopen final
judgments by retroactive legislation).
24
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The appointment provision of Article II underscores the Court’s special
role as the head of the federal judicial department by providing that Congress can
assign the appointment of inferior officers to courts of law. An inferior officer
must be inferior “to” a superior and Article III makes clear that the Court, rather
than the Chief Justice, occupies the relevant position of superiority. The Court’s
departmental supremacy explains why one cannot defend current arrangements by
regarding the Chief Justice as the “head of a department” within the meaning of
Article II. 30 Such a view would portray the FJC, the Administrative Office, and
the other components of the Article III bureaucracy as separate administrative
agencies over which the Chief exercises administrative oversight. But while
Congress has the power to create department heads with appointment power, such
officials must report to a superior official or body. For the Chief Justice, acting
within the judicial department, the relevant reporting obligation runs to the
Supreme Court itself.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly sketches the Chief’s
appointment powers, explores some of the criticisms their exercise has attracted,
and examines the defense of their constitutionality. Part II examines the origins
and early implementation of Article II’s provision for appointments by “courts of
law,” placing the provision in the context of post-revolutionary disdain for the
corrupt office selling and fee-based compensation of the English and colonial
judicial systems. Part II examines the Court’s early practice, which was
consistently court-centered, and links the provision for appointment by the courts
to the hierarchical structure of the third branch of government, which calls for the
Court to oversee the department’s exercise of the judicial function. Part III returns
to the constitutional puzzle, showing that the combined force of history and
structure cast doubt on the Chief’s role. After assessing some possible workarounds and concluding that they fail to address the concerns, Part III concludes
with some thoughts on how to make the transition from a Chief-based system of
appointments to one in which the Court performs an oversight function.
I.

THE APPOINTMENT POWERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Congress has given the Chief Justice of the United States power to fill a
wide range of offices within the judicial bureaucracy. In addition to such marquee
posts as the director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the
Chief serves as the chair of the board of directors of the Federal Judicial Center

30

See infra text accompanying note .
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and plays a role in selection of the FJC’s director. 31 For help with various
administrative chores, the Chief also appoints an administrative assistant who
works at the Supreme Court. 32 Depending on the Chief, the administrative
assistant can play a substantial role in the development of judicial branch policy. 33
Chief Justice Burger, in particular, was thought to have delegated significant
authority to his administrative assistant, Mark Cannon.34
In addition to the power to appoint officials within the judicial
bureaucracy, the Chief exercises control over the appointment of the members of
the committees that do much of the initial work in formulating policy for the
Article III judiciary. 35 Formal policy-making responsibility falls to the Judicial
Conference of the United States, which meets in March and September every
year. 36 The Chief presides at meetings of the Judicial Conference, but does not
pick its members. 37 According to statute, the Conference consists of the chief
judge of each circuit court of appeals, a district judge from each regional circuit
(elected by a vote of her peers), and the chief judge of the Court of International
Trade. 38 Between the March and September meetings, the Conference acts
through an executive committee made up of seven members of the Conference.39

31 28 U.S.C. § 621 (a)(1) (1996) (“the Chief Justice of the United States, who shall be the
permanent Chairman of the Board”); 28 U.S.C. § 624 (2011) (“This Board is
authorized…to appoint and fix the duties of the Director and the Deputy Director of the
Federal Judicial Center, who shall serve at the pleasure of the board”).
32 See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1590 n. 46 (discussing the creation of the
administrative assistant position at Chief Justice Burger’s request through 28 U.S.C. § 677
(a)-(b) (2000)).
33
While Chief Justice Burger’s administrative assistant served from the creation of the
position to the end of Burger’s tenure for a period of fourteen years, Chief Justice
Rehnquist limited the tenures of his administrative assistants to two to five year terms. Id.
at 1623-24 n. 211.
34 Id. at 1623 n. 210 (describing the “many nonadjudicative responsibilities” of Mark
Cannon and the close and confidential relationship he held with Chief Justice Burger).
35 See id. at 1597 n. 80-81 (finding that though statute only grants the Chief Justice
authority to appoint members of the Standing Committee, the Chief Justice appoints
members who sit on more than two dozen committees)
36
See
Sessions,
United
States
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Sessions.aspx (last visited Jan.
28, 2012).
37 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2008) (“[the Chief Justice] shall preside at such conference which shall
be known as the Judicial Conference”).
38 Id. § 331
39
See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
United
States
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx#conference (last visited Jan. 28, 2012)
(“The seven-member Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference serves as the senior
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The formulation of Judicial Conference policy begins at the committee
level. The Conference consists of some twenty committees, each of which has
jurisdiction over a specific set of issues and each of which consists of a number of
Article III judges who meet bi-annually. 40 Best known, the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure presides over a variety of rule-making
committees, such as those that work up recommended amendments to the rules of
civil procedure, appellate procedure, bankruptcy procedure, criminal procedure,
and so forth. 41 Less well known committees oversee such matters as court
administration, courthouse construction, federal-state jurisdiction, the federal
defenders program, and magistrate judges. 42 Acting on recommendations from the
director of the AO, the Chief appoints the chair and all of the members of these
committees. Committee members serve for three-year terms with the prospect,
often realized, 43 of reappointment to a second three-year term. 44 In a typical year,
the Chief may make some ten to fifteen such appointments.45

executive arm of the Conference”). The Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts serves as an ex-officio, non-voting member of the Executive Committee and
brings the roster total to eight. See Organization, United States Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Organization.aspx (last visited
Jan. 28, 2012); see also Two New Members Named to Judicial Conference’s Executive
Committee,
United
States
Courts
(Dec.
28,
2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/10-1228/Two_New_Members_Named_to_Judicial_Conference’s_Executive_Committee.aspx
(listing the number of committee members as eight and including the AO Director).
40 See Federal Court Governance and Administration: National, Federal Judicial Center,
http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/FCGA1 (last visited Jan. 28, 2012); see also Resnik
& Dilg, supra note 1, at 1597 n. 81 (detailing the number of Judicial Conference
committees as of 2006).
41 See Procedures for the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure and Its Advisory Rules Committees, Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 1, § 440.10
(the Judicial Conferences is required “to publish the procedures that govern the work of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the ‘Standing Committee’) and its advisory
committees on the Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure and on
the Evidence Rules”).
42
See Reports of the Proceedings, United States Courts (Sept. 2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?
doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/2011-09.pdf (recording the activities of
several of these committees at the Sept. 2011 meeting).
43
In Sept. of 2011, Chief Justice Roberts extended the terms of the chairs of the committee
on defender services, committee on information technology, and committee on intercircuit
assignments. See Carlyn Kolker, Chief Justice Names Judges to Policy Group Posts,
Reuters,
Sept.
21,
2011,
available
at
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/09__September/Chief_justice_names_judges_to_policy_group_posts/.
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The Chief also appoints the judges who sit on several specialty courts in
the United States. Perhaps most visibly, the Chief appoints members of the two
courts identified in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.46 Such courts sit to
review, in the first instance and on appeal, the government’s ex parte applications
for warrants to conduct specified kinds of electronic surveillance.47 The judges of
these FISA courts, drawn from the ranks of active Article III judges, typically
serve for a term of seven years. 48 They often meet at a secure location in the
Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. 49 Other specialty courts to which the
Chief makes term-limited appointments include the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation and the Alien Terrorist Removal Court.50
Needless to say, the Chief today does not sell the offices over which he
exercises appointment power. But critics have suggested that the Chief might use
the appointment power to influence policy. Perhaps most significantly, critics
argue that the Chief can staff specialty courts and Judicial Conference committees
with an eye to selecting judges with an agreeable conception of sound judicial
policy. Building on the attitudinal model of judicial behavior, some scholars
believe that Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a partisan approach to his judicial
appointments. Working on the assumption that the party of the nominating
44

See
Committees,
United
States
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Committees.aspx (last visited
Feb. 4, 2012) (specifying term lengths and the option of reappointment).
45
The Judicial Conference lists 17 various committee members whose terms began in
2011.
See
Rulemaking
Process,
United
States
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess.aspx
(last visited Feb. 8, 2012). Cf. Kolker, supra note 45 (reporting the appointment of eight
committee members and the renewal of three committee members’ terms in Sept. 2011).
46 50 USC § 1803(a)(1), (b) (2010). See Ruger, FISA, supra note 1 at 243-45 n. 19, 21
(describing the statutory history of the eleven judge FISA Court and the three judge FISA
Court of Review).
47
According to Ruger, the two FISA courts consider government requests for warrants
under a specialized probable cause standard requiring a lesser showing of cause than that
required under the Fourth Amendment standard. See Ruger, FISA, supra note 1, at 243-44
n. 15-16.
48 FISA Court judges are limited to serving a single, staggered term. 50 USC § 1803 (d)
(2010). See Ruger, FISA, supra note 1, at 244 n. 18.
49
See 50 USC § 1803 (a) (2010) (“The Chief Justice . . . shall designate 11 district court
judges . . . of whom no fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the District of
Columbia who shall constitute a court”).
50
28 USC § 1407 (2000) (“The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consist of
seven circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice”); for the
appointment provisions of the Alien and Terrorist Removal Court, see 8 USC § 1532 (a)
(1996) (“ The Chief Justice . . . shall publicly designate 5 district court judges from 5 of the
United States judicial circuits”).
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president reveals important information about the ideology of the judge, scholars
have observed that Rehnquist appointed more Republicans than Democrats to fill
crucial judicial offices, 51 particularly on the Special Division, which exercised
control over the appointment of independent prosecutors.52 Whatever the validity
of the attitudinal model in this (or other) contexts, the specter of a politicized
appointment process will linger as long as the Chief makes the appointments
himself.
Critics also worry that the Chief’s administrative responsibilities may
inform his views as a judge on a multi-member judicial body. As Professor Resnik
has shown, Chief Justice Burger urged Congress to deny bankruptcy judges Article
III status in the 1978 legislation that expanded the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts. 53 Later, when parties to a breach of contract claim challenged the
assignment of judicial power to non-Article III bankruptcy judges, Chief Justice
Burger defended the legislation from a constitutional challenge and dissented from
a decision invalidating the arrangement in part.54 A similar blurring of roles has
been said to have occurred under the stewardship of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The
Chief worked within the judicial bureaucracy to articulate a policy of opposition to
the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction and then voted as a member of the
Supreme Court to invalidate the Violence Against Women Act on the ground that
it exceeded congressional power in criminalizing gender-based violence.55
Professor Resnik contends that, in each instance, views that the Chief formed as

51

See Ruger, Judicial Appointment, supra note 1, at 394, Table 2 (listing Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s appointments by party).
52
See id. at 344 n. 10, 379 n. 156 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s appointment of
Judge David Sentelle to lead the Special Division and the division’s subsequent
appointment of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr to investigate President Clinton).
53
See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1611-12 (tracing Chief Justice Burger’s influence on
Congress and the Administrative Office as the two entities negotiated the status of
bankruptcy judges and their jurisdictional authority)
54
See id. at 1612 n. 149 (quoting Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) where he insisted that “a
radical restructuring of the present system of bankruptcy adjudication” was not a necessary
congressional response to the plurality decision).
55
See id. at 1613 (arguing that the creation of the new cause of action spurred action by the
Judicial Conference, presided over by the Chief Justice, to create an Ad Hoc Committee on
Gender-Based Violence to review the proposed legislation). For a full account, see Judith
Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence
Against Women Act, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 269 (2000).
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chief court administrator may have influenced the exercise of the Chief’s judicial
function as a Justice of the Supreme Court. 56
Despite these criticisms, the weight of scholarly opinion holds that the
Chief’s bureaucratic role should not be regarded as unconstitutional. 57 A variety of
considerations inform this constitutional consensus. First, the Chief’s powers have
grown up over time, beginning with Chief Justice Taft’s power to transfer judges
between regions and evolving into a practice so extensive that it could be difficult
to uproot. 58 Second, in the most nearly analogous case, Freytag, the Court upheld
the power of Congress to allow the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to appoint judges
of that body. 59 While the Justices disagreed as to whether the non-Article III Tax
Court would qualify as a “court of law” within the meaning of Article II, they did
not contest the power of the Chief Judge to act for the “court” in making the
appointments. This tendency to equate the Court with the Chief may explain the
general perception that the framers could not have meant to draw a sharp line
between the administrative work of a multi-member tribunal and the work of its
senior member.
Yet one can question each element of the constitutional consensus. While
Chief Justice Taft certainly worked to expand the office of Chief Justice, likening
it to the position of Lord Chancellor in England, one can point to an earlier practice
quite at odds with Taft’s approach. As we will see, the precedent-conscious Chief
Justice Jay took pains to ensure that the Court as such would act as the appointing
agency for all inferior officers and deliberately declined to assert control over
appointments himself. 60 Jay’s early conduct in the office, moreover, appears to
56

Professor Resnik suggests that rather than speaking of the “Rehnquist Court” scholars
should refer to the period as the “Rehnquist Judiciary” in recognition of the Chief Justice’s
broad influence over judiciary matters extending beyond adjudication. Id. at 1615. One
can, of course, question the claim that Chief Justice Rehnquist formed his view of the
Violence Against Women Act in the course of his administrative work. The Rehnquist
Court inaugurated a series of federalism-based restraints on congressional power in such
cases as New York v. United States, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, . The Chief Justice
supported these restrictions, and had long called on the Court to define limits on the
Commerce Power. See Garcia v. San Antonio Mass Transit Authority, (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
57 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 368-372; see also supra pp. 2-3. See
Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1; see also supra p. 3.
58
See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 350 (describing the Taft-era transfer
authority as a precursor to the modern appointments to specialized courts).
59
See supra pp. 2-3 and notes 13-14.
60 See infra text accompanying note . For the view that early actions by the Supreme Court
and other departments of the government set precedents that shape constitutional
understanding, see John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124
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reflect a perception that the line between the court, as the appointing agency, and
the person holding the position of Chief Justice, was one of constitutional
dimension. 61 By calling for the court to appoint, rather than the chief judge, the
framers may have meant to signal that official appointments were a public trust,
rather than a perquisite within the “gift” of the justices that could be exploited for
private gain. The next sections explore the origins and early implementation of the
provision for appointment by the “courts of law.”
II.

THE ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURTS OF LAW
PROVISION

The provision authorizing Congress to vest appointment authority in courts
of law emerged late in the work of the Philadelphia Convention and attracted little
attention in the ratification debates. Yet we have reason to believe that the choice
of the court as the appointing entity was part of a series of decisions that sought to
eliminate corrupting features from judicial office. In this part of the Essay, I
sketch the nature of judicial office in eighteenth century England and in the
colonies, explaining why the reliance on fee-paid compensation and patronagebased appointments grew controversial among the members of the founding
generation. I also explore the appointment provisions of the state constitutions,
particularly those in New York, where the author of Article II (Gouverneur Morris)
and the nation’s first Chief Justice, John Jay, wrestled with the problem of how to
structure appointments of inferior judicial officers. Finally, I sketch the
development of Article II, concluding that the choice of the “court” as the
approved recipient of appointment power was consistent with the framers’ decision
to eliminate non-salary based compensation for judges and to create a hierarchical
judicial system with a single Supreme Court.
A. Judicial Office in England and the Colonies
Judicial office in eighteenth century England, at least for the lucky few
who were appointed to serve on one of the three superior courts of common law or
Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 2033 (2011) (describing the Jay Court’s refusal to issue advisory
opinions as a foundational precedent); Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and
the Supreme Court's Use of History, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1745, 1787 (2006) (discussing the
significance of early practice in defining the meaning of the Constitution and noting in
particular Chief Justice Jay’s attitude toward the constitutionality of circuit riding).
Manning describes the underlying logic as crediting an interpretation adopted soon after the
enactment of a text in recognition that “[a]lterations in the legal and cultural landscape may
make the meaning hard [for future generations] to recover.” Manning, supra, at 2033
(quoting Judge Easterbrook).
61 See infra text accompanying note .
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as Chancellor, was a source of handsome financial reward. 62 Chief judges in
particular earned at least three sources of income, all of which were regarded as a
species of property attached to the judicial office itself.63 First, the judges were
paid a salary. This had been a matter of some controversy; the Stuarts had claimed
the right to pay the salary of their appointed judges and to commission them during
pleasure. The Act of Settlement (1701) provided instead that the judges were to
serve during good behavior (which meant they were not subject to at-will dismissal
by the Crown) and that the salaries were to be paid by the Parliament. 64 While
often associated with judicial independence, the Act of Settlement might be viewed
as expressing a preference for judicial dependence on Parliament rather than on the
Crown.
Apart from salaries, superior court judges earned income in the form of
fees, paid by litigants as part of the costs of litigation. 65 Fees varied from court to
court in terms of their corrupting influence. In the superior courts, the fees were
paid by the losing party (in keeping with the loser pays system in England) and
thus did not tend to influence the outcome of the dispute. 66 The judges were paid
their fees, no matter which way they ruled on the merits. In the court of admiralty,
by contrast, judicial fees could depend on the outcome. Thus, admiralty judges
earned substantial fees when they condemned a vessel as lawful prize but far less
when they acquitted the vessel of wrongdoing. 67 This incentive to condemn would
violate due process today; 68 it was no more popular in colonial America as the
62 The superior courts of common law, King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, each
employed four judges, one of whom was the Chief Judge (or Justice) and the remainder of
whom were associate (or puisne) judges. These twelve judges enjoyed tenure during good
behavior under the Act of Settlement (1701). See James Pfander, Removing Federal
Judges, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1227, 1235 n. 37 (citing the Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13
Will. 3, ch. 2.)
63 See Duman, supra note 16, at 111.
64 Act of Settlement 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.). See Pfander, Judicial
Compensation, supra note 15, at 8 n. 30 (noting that the Act’s establishment of judicial
salary did not preclude litigant fees).
65
Id. at 8 (discussing the different stages in the litigation process - including
commencement, process, and jury empanelment - at which fees were incurred), See infra
Table.
66 Id. at 8 n. 32 (discussing the origins of the loser pays system in England and contrasting
the system to the “American” rule requiring that each party pay its own attorneys’ fees).
67
See Duman, supra note 16, at 115 (noting the large disparities in British Admiralty
judges’ incomes during times of war and peace as a result of the cut judges received when
granting an award in wartime prize cases; this led to an income increase of up to £5,500 for
the judges during wartime).
68
See Pfander, Judicial Compensation at 10 n. 44 (referring to Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927) and Connally v. Georgia 429 U.S. 245 (1977): two Supreme Court cases that
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mode by which the vice-admiralty courts enforced various mercantile
regulations. 69
Fees and salaries were supplemented by the right of judges to derive
income from the appointment of individuals to offices within the judge’s “gift.”70
Judges with a substantial patronage in offices could secure revenue in two ways. 71
They could sell the offices outright, bargaining with the purchaser in the
expectation that the appointment to a sinecure would provide an annuity for the life
of individual installed. 72 Alternatively, they could appoint a member of their own
immediate or extended family to the post, thus ensuring that the income flowed to
objects of the judge’s affection. 73 The value of patronage obviously depended on
the length of the appointing judge’s service; more offices would become vacant
and require re-appointment over the course of a long tenure on the bench. Like
invalidated a conviction and a warrant issue, respectively, by judges who received a fee on
condition that they convict and approve of the warrant).
69
On the controversial character of the admiralty courts during the run-up to independence,
see C. Ubbelohde, The Vice Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution (1960); D.S.
Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America,
1764-1776, Wm & Mary Q. (1959).
70 On the origins of office sales in early Norman history, linking office to a form of feudal
property and describing its corrupting influence, see William Holdsworth, 1 A History of
English Law 246-51 (7th ed. 1956). For criticisms of the sale of office, see G.E. Aylmer,
The King’s Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-42, at 225-30 (1974)
(describing the impeachment of Buckingham in 1626 for corrupt sale of office and setting
forth a series of contemporary criticisms of the practice including the concern that wealth,
rather than merit, would determine advancement). Efforts to reform the sale of office did
not succeed in the early modern period, in part due to the wide range of exceptions; thus,
an English act of Parliament in 1552 expressly saved the rights of the several Chief Justices
to retain the proceeds of office sales. See Aylmer, supra, at 228. Reform efforts finally
took hold in the early nineteenth century under the influence of Jeremy Bentham. See
Holdsworth, supra, at 248, 262-64 (describing the reforms and attributing them to
Bentham). By the time the reform efforts gained steam, several inferior officers of King’s
Bench enjoyed absolute sinecures; they did no work at all (having delegated it all to
deputies who were also paid through the fees they collected). See id. at 257-59 (reporting
that, by 1810, fifteen offices in the court of King’s Bench were either absolute or partial
sinecures). No wonder reformers complained of the law’s expense and delay.
71 See Duman, supra note 16 at 116 (detailing the patronage received by the Chancellor, the
Chief Justice of King’s Bench, and the Chief Justice of Common Pleas).
72 If not sold outright, a judge might have chosen to keep the office for himself as a
supplemental income. See id.
73
Logically, the more prized offices were often gifted to close relatives or sons of the
judges, while judges gave the less important offices to extended family and friends. See id.
Even where the office was in the gift of a lower ranking figure, such as the master of the
rolls in chancery, it was customary for the purchaser of an office to pay a douceur or
brokerage fee to the Chancellor. See Aylmer, supra note, at 227.

Court-Based Appointment of Inferior Officers

16

fees, this form of income was quite unevenly divided. While the Lord Chancellor
and the two Chief Justices (those of King’s Bench and Common Pleas) derived
substantial income from official patronage, the nine puisne (or associate) justices
of the common law courts derived considerably less income from litigant fees and
the sale of offices. 74
Historians have reckoned the value of these three sources of judicial
income. According to Duman, at around the turn of the nineteenth century, the
annual value of judicial office was as follows: 75
Court

Office

Salary 76

Fees

Patronage

Total

Lord
Chancellor

£5,000

£5,000 77

£15,000 78

£25,000

£2,500 79

£6,900* 80

£13,400

£3,000 81

£23,000 82

£30,000

Chancery

King’s
Bench

Master of
£4,000
the Rolls

Chief
74

£4,000

See infra Table.
See Duman, supra note 16, at 105.
76 See id. at 112-13, Table 9 (Salary figures are based on Duman’s projections for the year
1790 for all offices except the Master of Rolls, whose salary is unknown for that year. The
salary of the Master of Rolls is based on Duman’s figure from 1750. The salaries for
Associate Justices of the King’s Bench, Associate Justices of the Court of Common Pleas,
and the Associate of the Exchequer are based on Duman’s projections for puisne judges
and barons in 1790).
77
Id. at 111, 114. The Lord Chancellor’s remunerations were also augmented by income
collected for serving as Speaker of the House. In addition to the £5,000 collected in fees,
Lord Hardwicke received nearly £1,100 per annum from 1736 and 1755 for officiating as
Speaker.
78
Id. at 116 (based on Duman’s finding of an 1810 House of Commons committee report
documenting that the Lord Chancellor received £6,391 for offices in his gift and that
relatives of former Chancellors held offices worth an additional £8,790 per year).
79
Id. at 114. From 1751-1753, the Master of the Rolls received an annual fee between
£2,400-£2,500 from the Hanaper Officer.
80 Id. at 120. *Represents patronage figure for the first half of the eighteenth century for a
total of 13 offices.
81 Id. at 119.
75
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Justice
Associate
Justices
Common
Pleas
Chief
Justice
Associate
Justices
Exchequer
Chief
Baron
Associate
Barons

£2,400

£500 83

£3,500

£1,100 84

£2,900

£10,000 85

£2,400

£3,500
£2,400

£14,600
£2,400

£4,200 86

£7,700
£2,400

As these figures reveal, chief justices often earned more from fees and patronage
than from straight salary. Not captured in these figures, though doubtless
significant, royal pensions were often made available to judges after they retired.87

82

Id. at 119. The patronage figure for the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench is based on
Duman’s annual projection for the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries, which
represents a period prior to England’s reformation of the patronage and sinecure system in
England.
83 Id. at 115 (based on an account by Sydney Stafford Smythe, a puisne judge during the
reign of George I. The figure listed represents an average of fees from £426 in 1750 and
£731 in 1754).
84 Id. at 120.
85
Id. at 120.
86 Id. at 120 (this figure is an estimate calculated by figuring the amount per office that the
Master of Rolls received (£530) and multiplying this amount by the 8 officials the Chief
Baron was able to appoint). For the Master of Rolls patronage figure, see supra note 60 and
Table.
87
In particular, the Chancellor and the two Chief Justices often received “royal patents,”
which provided their retirement pensions. It was not until 1799 that an official pension
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Eventually, a reform-minded Parliament in the nineteenth century
conducted investigations of fees and patronage and made changes in the rules.88
The general thrust of the reforms was to seek greater transparency and greater
reliance on salary-based compensation. Viewing fees and patronage as sources of
make-work and corruption that tended to delay and multiply the cost of judicial
proceedings, Parliament attempted to wean the judges away from these sources of
income. 89 Reform-minded Americans beat their English cousins to the punch;
many of the post-revolutionary state constitutions had already attempted to
regulate the collection of official fees and perquisites of office.90
B. Sale of Office in the Colonies and States
The colonies of British North America had experience with fee-paid
offices, with the use of the appointment power to influence political allegiance, and
with the multiplication of offices aimed more at providing income to elites than
services to the people. Governors earned a salary and a variety of fees, including
fees for performing judicial functions. 91 In addition, governors earned an income
and a measure of influence through the disposition of the many offices in their
gift. 92 Some governors, in fine, never moved to America; they simply sold the
office to a deputy and collected a portion of the salary while living in England.
system provided an annual pension of £4,000 for the Chancellor, £3,000 for the Chief
Justices and Chief Baron, £2,500 for the Master of the Rolls, and £2,000 for all other
judges. Id. at 121, 124 n. 49. Obviously, a pension system that was subject to some royal
discretion could influence the behavior of judges seeking to ensure pension eligibility after
retirement.
88
See Sir William Holdsworth, 1 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 262 (1982) (finding that
salary reform and the elimination of many sinecure offices were the immediate result of the
publication of such investigations).
89
Id. at 647 (“Payment by fees, saleable offices, and sinecure places were the predominant
characteristics of a bureaucracy which could not be defended even upon historical
grounds”).
90
See infra text accompanying note .
91 See 2 The Colonial Records of North Carolina: 1713-1728, 158-59 (2000) (complaining
that the governor is “by his Commission made Captain General, Chancellor, Chief Justice,
and Admiral, which are great and different powers and can never be justly executed by one
person”); Michael Kammen, Colonial New York: A History 201-02 (1975) (cataloging the
range of salaries, fees, bribes and other perquisites collected by the colonial governor of
New York).
92 See 2 Records, supra note , at 159 (complaining that a governor who has obtained the
office through influence, rather than merit, would sell “his judgments and decrees to the
highest bidder, and all places both Civill and Millitary without any regard to the fitness of
the persons to execute them. . . . He protects the inferior Officers and others who pay him
yearly pencions, in the neglect and breach of their duty; so that all complaints and
prosecutions against them are in vain.”)
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The same was true of customs officials, who often sold the post to a deputy and
stayed at home. 93
We lack a detailed history of the sale of office in British North America,
but the evidence suggests that the practice was widespread and occasionally
controversial. We have the following vivid set of grievances from the lower house
of the Maryland assembly, which first criticized the governor for allowing
excessive fees to be charged in connection with judicial proceedings and then
added the following:
We cannot omit mentioning . . . another practice lately crept in among us,
that of Buying and selling the Offices of the County Clerks and the very
persons who receive the Profits of the Offices of Clerks & Registers
Practising as Attorneys in the Courts to which these Offices belong[.
T]hat such sales are unlawful is too obvious to be denied. 94
Similar complaints arose in North Carolina and Massachusetts, where the people
complained about governors who chose officials on the basis of corrupt
considerations (rather than merit) and then protected the officials in question when
the people complained about their incompetence.95
Governors naturally resented any intrusion on their powers of patronage,
often to little avail. Labaree recounts the story of one Massachusetts governor who
was saddened to learn that London had appointed a naval officer for the province;
the governor was forced to turn his own son-in-law out of the office and deny his

93

Leonard Woods Labaree, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH
COLONIAL SYSTEM BEFORE 1783, 102-04 (1930). Occasionally, controversies arose over
fee-paid office and reliance on deputies to perform essential government functions. For
example, one office holder complained about his suspension from office on the ground that
he had paid good money for the position. See Letter from Samuel Johnston to North
Carolina Governor Martin, Nov. 16, 1775, in 10 The Colonial Records of North Carolina:
1775-1776, 332-33 (2000) (“the office which I have for some years past executed under the
Deputation of Mr. Turner was an honest purchase for which I have punctually paid an
annual sum”).
94 40 Archives of Maryland: 1737-1740, 392-93 (Bernard Christian Steiner ed. 1921).
95 See 2 Colonial Records of North Carolina, supra note _, at 159 (criticizing the sale of
offices “without any regard to the fitness of the persons to execute them” and noting that
the governor protects inferior officers and others who pay yearly pensions “in the neglect
and breach of their duty; so that all complaints and prosecutions against them are in vain.”);
Carl Russell Fish, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 1 (1905) (recording the
complaint of John Adams that Governor Frances Hutchinson of Massachusetts had passed
over proper candidates in order to advance members of his own family).
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children “so much bread.” 96 But more than bread was at stake; governors felt that
the efficiency of the administration depended on their ability to insist that
subordinates do their jobs. Office-holders who held patents directly from London,
rather than through the colonial governor, felt no sense of allegiance to, and little
need to obey, the governor. Customs officials in particular were notably reluctant
to follow gubernatorial advice.
One can see growing resentment of colonial patronage practices in the
provisions of the great state papers that attended the movement to independence
from England. For starters, the Declaration of Independence included the
following complaint against the King’s patronage:
He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of
officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance. 97
Scholars agree that this vivid complaint attempts to convey popular discontent with
the Crown’s tendency to use offices as sinecures for the benefit of “placemen.” 98
(It may also take issue with the Crown’s attempt to make the customs office more
efficient by requiring the officials to move to North America to perform their
office, rather than to assigning the obligations to a do-nothing deputy.) Discontent
with the corrupting influence of the appointment power also shows up in the
Articles of Confederation of the newly independent states, which articulates an
early version of the Constitution’s incompatibility clause: Article V prohibited
delegates to the Continental Congress from “holding any office under the United
States, for which he, or another for his benefit receives any salary, fees or
emolument of any kind.” 99 Here one finds a reflection of two ideas: that office can
corrupt the exercise of independent legislative judgment and that the corrupting
influence of office can operate indirectly, by conferring valuable fees and
emoluments on family members or others beholden to the delegate.
State constitutions addressed the problem of official corruption in the
appointment process through a variety of different approaches. Some states
96

Labaree, supra note , at 105.
Decl. of Indep., para. 12 (U.S. 1776).
See Gordon Wood, supra note , at 213 (quoting William Henry Drayton speaking of the
placemen as ‘strangers destitute of property and natural alliance in the Colonies’ who
create laws for a country ‘in which they have no interest but their commissions’); see also
Pfander, Judicial Compensation, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing officeholders who
benefited from fee payments but performed little substantive work and the resulting anger
of colonists).
99
Arts. of Confed., art. V, para. 2.
97
98
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responded by relying on the popular election of state and local officials or by
placing the appointment power in the legislative branch of government, thus
depriving civil officers of
the appointment power and any share of patronage that the power had previously
conferred. Georgia followed this approach.100 Some states authorized the
executive and judicial branches of government to exercise some control over
appointments, but hemmed in those appointment powers in various ways. For
example, Pennsylvania established an elected council to control the appointment of
important officers. 101 Some states were unwilling to rely entirely on the structure
of the appointment power to deal with corruption and abuse. In these states, the
constitution included provisions that barred the holding of multiple offices and the
receipt of fees and emoluments. 102 These states were working out a new
conception of judicial office in which the judge would receive a fixed or stated
salary and would not be entitled to fees and perquisites of office.103
Maryland’s constitution provides a good example of the shift from a fee
paid office to one in which the salary was meant to provide full compensation.
After providing for the payment of salaries, “liberal, but not profuse,” to the
chancellor and other state judges, the Maryland constitution provided that “[n]o
Chancellor or Judge ought to hold any other office, civil or military, or receive fees
or perquisites of any kind.” 104 By barring fees and perquisites, the provision
apparently clarifies that the judges were not to receive fees from the litigants who
appeared before them or perquisites in any form. A similar provision appeared in
the Pennsylvania constitution, which provided fixed salaries for judges and
100

See Ga. Const., art. LIII (“All civil officers in each county shall be annually elected on
the day of the general election, except justices of the peace and registers of probates, who
shall be appointed by the house of assembly”).
101
Under Pennsylvania’s Constitution of 1776, the executive included both a president and
council. The council was made up of twelve men elected by freemen, and members served
one to three year terms as opposed to the president’s annual election by the state’s
assembly and the council. Scott Gerber, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606-1787, 281-82 n. 67.
102
Article 10 of Connecticut’s 1818 Constitution explicitly prohibited judges from holding
multiple offices. See id. at 154. Similarly, under Article 35 of the North Carolina
Constitution of 1776, no “Judge of the Supreme Court of Law or Equity, or Judge of
admiralty” could hold an additional office. Id. at 203. For a discussion of Maryland’s
constitutional bar on fees and multiple office holding, see supra note 82.
103
As correspondent with those who framed the North Carolina Constitution, John Adams
expressed his adamant views that the judiciary ‘should not have their Minds distracted with
complicated jarring Interests…and…Salaries Should be fixed by Law.’ See Gerber, supra
note 101, at 202.
104 See Md. Const., art. 30 (1776)
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prohibited them from holding any other office or receiving “fees or perquisites of
any kind.” 105 In both of these states, then, the judges were entitled only to their
salary and were barred from receiving other sources of income from their office.
Although the two constitutions do not so provide in terms, they would apparently
prohibit judges from selling any inferior offices within their power; income of that
sort would presumably qualify as a prohibited perquisite of office. 106
As for the appointment of inferior judicial officers, a range of different
approaches prevailed, some of surprising intricacy. In Delaware, for example, the
appointment of the judges was vested in the president and general assembly. But
the appointment of a variety of inferior judicial officers, including the registers in
chancery, the clerks of the courts of common pleas and orphans’ courts, and clerks
of the peace, was vested in the president and privy council. 107 Meanwhile, the
appointment of the clerk of the supreme court was vested in the chief justice of that
court and the appointment of the recorders of deeds was vested in the “judges” of
the courts of common pleas. 108 At the same time, the Delaware constitution
appears to have ruled out patronage based appointments to inferior judicial office
at least in part; it provided that the “registers in chancery and clerks shall not be
justices of either of the said courts of which they are officers.” 109
Of all the constitutional experiments at the state level, perhaps the most
significant developments occurred in New York. There, John Jay, Gouverneur
105

See Pa. Const., sec. 23 (“The judges of the supreme court of judicature shall have fixed
salaries . . ; they shall not be allowed . . . to hold any other office civil or military, nor to
take or receive fees or perquisites of any kind.”)
106 The apparent ban on judicial sale of inferior office in Maryland appears to be confirmed
by the restrictive nature of the provision that allows the “judges” of the superior courts to
appoint their own clerks. The provision begins with a rather open-ended grant of authority,
allowing “the Judges of the General Court, and Justices of the County Courts” to “appoint
the Clerks of their respective Courts.” But this provision appears to contemplate that the
appointments will occur during a regular session of the court. During vacation, the period
between regularly scheduled sessions of court, or removal of the officer out of State “the
Governor, with the advice of the Council, may appoint and commission a fit and proper
person to such vacant office respectively, to hold the same until the meeting of the next
General Court, or County Court, as the case may be.” See Md. Const., art. 47 (1776).
107 See Del. Const., art. 12 (1776) (“The president and privy council shall appoint the
secretary, the attorney-general, registers for the probate of wills and granting letters of
administration, registers in chancery, clerks of the courts of common pleas and orphans'
courts, and clerks of the peace”).
108 See Del. Const., art. 14 (1776) (“The clerks of the supreme court shall be appointed by
the chief justice thereof, and the recorders of deeds, by the justices of the courts of common
pleas for each county severally”).
109 Id., art. 12.
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Morris, and Robert Livingston collaborated in developing a provision that called
for the creation of a general purpose council of appointment made up of four
senators, one from each district, and the governor of the state.110 In addition to this
general purpose mechanism, the New York constitution specified a mode for the
appointment of court clerks and other judicial personnel:
The register and clerks in chancery be appointed by the chancellor; the
clerks of the supreme court, by the judges of the said court; the clerk of the
court of probate, by the judge of the said court; and the register and
marshal of the court of admiralty, by the judge of the admiralty. 111
Jay objected to this provision and argued in a letter sent to Morris and Livingston
in the immediate aftermath of the New York constitution’s adoption that the judges
were not a proper recipient of the power to appoint their own clerks. Taking a
page from classic republican theory, Jay argued that the judges “will be tempted
not only to give these appointments to their Children Brothers Relatives and
Favorites, but to continue them in office against the public Good.”112 Among other
things, Jay worried that the judges would develop a “partiality” to their appointees,
and would combine with them to “conceal[] or excuse[] their mutual Defects or
misdemeanors.” 113 Jay’s criticism of vesting appointment power in the judges may
110

See New York Const., Apr. 20, 1777, sec. XXIII (council, made up of four senators and
the governor, given power to nominate and, with advice and consent of the legislative
council, appoint all officers other than those with modes of appointment otherwise
specified). For an account of the collaboration of Jay, Morris, and Livingston, see Jared
Sparks, I The Life of Gouverneur Morris 122-23 (1832) (describing a meeting in
Livington’s rooms at which Jay presented a plan for the council and secured the support of
Morris and Livingston); see also Arthur Paul Kaufman, The Constitutional Views of
Gouverneur Morris 194-202 (1992) (recounting the development of the council and Jay’s
subsequent letter to Morris and Livingston). For an account of the subsequent history of
the council of appointment, see Carl Russell Fish, supra note , at 86-91(describing the way
politicians used the council as a mechanism for patronage appointments, setting the stage
for the spoils system).
111 New York Const., Apr. 20, 1777, sec. XXVII.
112 Letter from Jay to Morris, Apr. 29, 1777, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note , at 683
n.1.
113 Id. The subsequent history of the office of clerk of the federal district courts certainly
appears to bear out Jay’s prediction. As described in Scott Messinger’s intriguing history,
federal court clerks came to behave just as the republican critics of fee-paid office would
have predicted. See I. Scott Messinger, Order in the Courts: A History of the Federal
Court Clerk’s Office (Federal Judicial Center 2002). Over the course of the nineteenth
century, Congress took a series of steps to regulate the affairs of the clerk’s offices, fearing
that their reliance on fees tended to encourage graft and corruption. See id. at 26 (quoting
President Millard Fillmore’s criticism of fee-paid clerks as the cause of “vexation,
complaint, and injustice”). One important reform was to establish a uniform bill of fees in
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have informed later developments. Ten years later, Gouverneur Morris was to
draft the court-based appointment provision of Article II and, as we shall see
below, Jay himself was to institute the practice of court-based appointments when
he became the nation’s first Chief Justice.
C. Framing the Courts of Law Provision in Article II
By the time of the framing, state experience with legislative control of the
appointment process had persuaded many Federalists of the wisdom of lodging
responsibility in a single chief executive. 114 Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson,
and Gouverneur Morris, in particular, shared the view that a multi-member body
was an inappropriate recipient of the appointment power.115 During June
discussions of the selection of federal judges, Wilson opposed appointment by the
legislature on the ground that “intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the
necessary consequences.” 116 James Madison said much the same thing, echoing
the concern with intrigue and adding the point that members of the legislature were
not good “judges of the requisite qualifications.”117 Morris explained his similar
view in a criticism of the August 1787 Committee of Detail draft, which assigned
the appointment power to the Senate:
He considered the body as too numerous for the purpose; as subject to
cabal; and as devoid of responsibility. If judges were to be tried by the

1853, but problems continued. Id. at 27. Eventually, Congress installed oversight through
the Department of Justice, in 1870, but judges often acted to protect their clerks and their
entitlement to fees. In 1912, an investigation by DoJ revealed clerical misconduct in some
28 districts, leading to a series of indictments and convictions. Id. at 41. Recounting their
opposition to reforms that would abolish the fee system and put clerks on salary, Felix
Frankfurter derided the clerks as “placemen whose clerical jobs were threatened.” Id. at 40
(quoting Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 133-34 (1928)).
114 For the classic account of the movement away from legislative toward executive
appointment, see Gordon Wood, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787
(1969).
115 See The Federalist, No. 77, at 462 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)
(“Every mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be a conclave, in which
cabal and intrigue will have their full scope.”). See also John Adams, 3 Defence of the
Constitutions of the Governments of the United States 310 (1778) reprinted in The Political
Writings of John Adams (George A. Peek, Jr. ed. 2003) (describing the executive as
capable of cautious and “responsible” appointments, whereas a representative assembly is
“accountable to nobody”).
116 See 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 128 (Max Farrand rev. ed. 1966)
(recording June 5, 1787 remarks of James Wilson) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records].
117 Id. at 120 (remarks of Madison).
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Senate . . . it was particularly wrong to let the Senate have the filling of
vacancies which its own decrees were to create.118
Eventually, the convention came part way around to the views of the Federalists,
adopting the now familiar provision for an appointment power initiated by the
president, who nominates and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
appoints judges and other high government officials.119
Having solved the problem of appointment to high office, the convention
addressed the question of how to appoint inferior officers. Here, Morris played a
leading role, proposing a provision that would authorize Congress to vest the
appointment of inferior officers “in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in
the heads of departments.” 120 Notably, the provision authorizes the assignment of
appointment power to a multi-member body, the court, rather than to the judges or
Chief Justices of the courts. The provision thus differs both from the New York
constitution (which vested power in the judges of the several courts) and from the
other provisions in Article II that appear to call for individuals (the president or the
department heads) to exercise the appointment power.121 As we have seen, Morris
and his fellow Federalists generally opposed the assignment of appointment power
to multi-member bodies, worrying about corruption, intrigue, and concealment.122
The convention’s choice of the “courts” as the only (obvious) multi-member body
to which Congress can assign the appointment power thus demands explanation.123
In seeking an explanation for the choice of the “courts,” we might begin by
observing the difference, in formal terms, between the work of courts and the work
of the judges who serve on those courts. Courts conducted judicial business on the
118 See 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
(Max Farrand rev. ed. 1966)
(recording Aug. 23, 1787 remarks of Gouverneur Morris) [hereinafter 2 Farrand’s
Records].
119 The decisive vote on the appointments power came on September 7, 1787 after the
convention had settled the mechanism by which the president was to be elected. See id. at
533. For an account of the dynamic
120 Id. at 627 (recording Sept. 15, 1787 remarks of Govr. Morris).
121 Cf. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct.
3138 (2010) (concluding that the multi-member Securities and Exchange Commission
could be considered a department “head” for purposes of the appointment clause).
122 See supra text accompanying notes 85, 88.
123 The Court has now concluded that another, less obvious, multi-member body can
exercise the appointment power as a department “head.” See note 121 supra. One
might argue that the convention chose the “courts” as a generic place-holder in light of the
fact that it was framing a constitution to govern a judicial system that had not yet been
established. But it would have surely been just as easy to draft a place-holder reference to
judges (“judges of the courts of law”) had that been the intention of the framers.
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record, on days officially designated for the conduct of such business, and the
public was free to attend.124 Judges, by contrast, were free to conduct business out
of court, or in their chambers, and often did so in connection with chores they
viewed as ministerial. The public, on-the-record quality of the actions of a “court”
may have lessened the concern with cabal and intrigue that otherwise arose when
multi-member bodies made appointments. Courts of law would presumably owe
an obligation to make their appointments part of the public record, thus exposing
the judges to criticism if they were to make patronage-based appointments that
favored family members or other unqualified favorites. The choice of the courts as
the approved recipient of the appointment power may thus reflect an attempt to
clarify that the power of appointment was to be a public trust, rather than a private
source of personal patronage or judicial emolument.
Judicial practice in the early republic frequently distinguished between the
judge or judges of the court and the court itself. Courts, under the Judiciary Act of
1789, were to sit for periods of time specified in the Act, often less than the full
year. Thus, the Supreme Court was to sit as such in February and August of each
year, continuing until the business before the Court was complete.125 During the
remainder of the year, the Justices dispersed to hold circuit courts throughout the
country. 126 Those courts, in turn, were directed to meet at specified times and
places. Questions might arise as to what sort of relief a judge of the circuit or
Supreme Court could provide during “vacation,” the times when the court itself

124

On the public quality of court days in colonial and early statehood America, see A.G.
Roeber, Authority, Law, and Custom: The Rituals of Court Day in Tidewater Virginia,
1720-1750, Wm & Mary Q. (1980). See also Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia,
1740–1790, 90 (University of North Carolina Press, 1999) (“In the monthly concourse at
the courthouse the male part of Virginia county society became visible to its members in a
manner similar to that observed at the parish church”). On the distinction between the work
of judges in chambers or during vacation, and the work of courts, __. Cf. Draft Letter from
the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Sept. 13, 1790) 2 DHSC at 88-92
(criticizing the assignment of circuit-riding duties to the Justices of the Supreme Court on
the basis of the perceived difficulty of separating courts from the judges that serve them).
125 Early terms of Court lasted but a few days; the Court had no business to conduct other
than the ceremonial and formal business of admitting lawyers to practice before the Court.
For an account, see DHSC, supra note , at __ (reporting the Court’s first sessions as
devoted to admission of counsel and other housekeeping work); Julius Goebel, Jr., History
of the Supreme Court: Antecedents and Beginnings, 1789-1801, 663 (1969) (observing
that it was not until 1796 “that a substantial amount of appellate business was ready for
disposition”).
126 For an account of the burdens of circuit riding and the Justices’ efforts to secure
legislative relief, see Pfander, Judicial Compensation, supra note , at 31-34.
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was not sitting. 127 Vacation, and the distinction between court and judge, figured
prominently in Justice John Rutledge’s reaction to a petition asking the circuit
court for the district of North Carolina to issue a writ of certiorari to remove an
action brought by Robert Morris from the courts of that state. According to a
contemporaneous letter from Morris’s attorney, Rutledge was willing to grant
relief on the merits but doubted his power to act as a judge out of court. 128 District
judges were free to act for their own account during vacation; indeed, some
continued to act as lawyers in state court proceedings until a federal statute forbade
the practice. 129
By making the court the appointing body, and countering the notion that
judges were to exercise the power for their own account, Article II appears to have
complemented other features of the Constitution that worked an important change
in the nature of judicial office. Article III provides that the judges of both the
supreme and inferior courts are to receive, at stated times, a compensation for their
services that shall not be diminished during their continuation in office. 130 For a
variety of reasons, one can probably best interpret the provision as creating a
regime of presumptively salary-based compensation. Certainly the delegates who
debated the compensation provision at Philadelphia appear to have assumed that it
called for the payment of a salary, and ruled out the receipt of fees for judicial
127 The existence of vacations helps to explain why the Judiciary Act invested the judges
themselves with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, recognizing the time sensitive
nature of inquiry into the legality of detention. See JA89, sec. 14 (providing, in addition to
the power of federal courts to grant habeas “that either of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, as well as Judges of the district Courts, shall have power to grant writs of Habeas
Corpus for the purpose of an enquiry into the cause of commitment.”); see also Pfander,
supra note 27, at 1486-87 (observing that the limited terms of the early federal courts meant
that federal judges were often riding circuit and needed power to oversee the legality of
detention as judges, rather than as courts).
128 See 2 DHSC, at 95, 98 (reproducing a letter from Richard Nichols Harison to Robert
Morris, dated September 24, 1790, stating that Judge Rutledge “made no Objection to the
Propriety of removing the Suit, or to granting the Injunction so far as the Merits of the
Cause were concerned; but he was unwilling solely to take upon him, during the Vacation
the Office of directing the Measures which are prayed by the bill”). Similarly, when the
invalid pension statute became controversial in the early 1790s, some Justices proposed to
solve the problem by acting as commissioners out of court, although questions arose about
that solution. See Pfander, Judicial Compensation, supra note 15, at __. See also David P.
Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-93, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev.
606, 640 (1996) (noting that Congress fixed the invalid pension act by separating the judge
from the court and assigning the judge certain extra-judicial duties).
129 See Pfander, Judicial Compensation, supra note , at 23 n.118 (describing federal statute
that forbade federal judges from practicing law).
130 U.S. Const., art. III, § 1.
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service. 131 In addition, when Congress implemented the Article III compensation
provision, it did so by providing the judges with an annual salary, to be paid on a
quarterly basis. 132 What’s more, when Congress learned that a federal judge in
South Carolina was collecting fees in admiralty cases, it promptly enacted a fee bill
to govern such cases that ruled out the collection of judicial fees and thus curtailed
the practice. 133 Just as the early practice under Article III appears to confirm the
doubts some expressed about the propriety of fee-based judicial compensation,
early steps taken by Congress and the Supreme Court to implement Article II
similarly confirm that court-based appointments were aimed in part at foreclosing
the favoritism, bias, and possible self-dealing inherent in the judicial appointment
of inferior officers. To that evidence of early practice this Essay now turns.
D. Implementing Article II
Early legislation erecting courts of the United States and empowering them
to hire clerks, criers, and other personnel consistently assigned the appointment
power to the courts, rather than to the judges staffing them. What’s more, Chief
Justice Jay’s approach to the appointment of the first clerk of the Supreme Court,
John Tucker, revealed that he took quite seriously the difference between courtbased and Chief-based appointments. While the judges of many district courts
were less punctilious than Jay about preserving the formal distinction between
court-based and judge-based appointments, 134 it was not until the Court’s 1839
decision in Ex parte Hennen that district court judicial control of the appointment
and removal of clerks became an acknowledged part of the legal framework of
office. 135
131

See supra text accompanying note 21.
See Pfander, Judicial Compensation, supra note 16, at 24 n. 122 (discussing the
Compensation and Process Acts of 1789); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
133
After the act’s passage, Thomas Bee, the district court judge for the District of South
Carolina, acknowledged that the 1793 statute prohibited his practice of fee collection. See
id. at 25-26 n. 133-34.
134 Congress provided for but a single judge to staff each of the federal district courts, thus
creating an identity between court and judge that may have encouraged a sense of judicial
entitlement. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 3, 1 Stat. 73 (establishing in each of
thirteen districts a district court “to consist of one judge”). Whatever the reason, some
district “courts” appointed the judge’s family members to serve as clerks. See, e.g.,
Messinger, Clerks, supra note , at 2 (reporting that David Sewall, district judge for the
district of Maine, appointed his nephew Henry as clerk).
135 See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225 (1839) (concluding that the district court
judge had discretion to remove the court clerk, not for cause, but to make room for the
appointment of the judge’s friend). Shortly after Hennen came down, Congress enacted a
provision empowering the circuit court to hire its own clerk and specifying that in cases of
132
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The story of legislative implementation begins with Section 7 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which specified the appointment of inferior judicial officers
in the following terms:
That the Supreme Court, and the district courts shall have power to appoint
clerks for their respective courts, and that the clerk for each district court
shall be clerk also of the circuit court in such district. 136
The provision appears to have been quite consciously modeled on the language of
Article II and seeks to vest the appointment power in the courts themselves, rather
than in the judges. Elsewhere, the legislation provided that the Supreme Court was
to consist of a Chief Justice and five associate Justices.137 Clearly, Congress opted
to place the appointment power in the Court itself, rather than in the Chief.
Some might argue that the provision for appointing marshals complicates
the story of early implementation.138 Section 27 provides that a “marshal shall be
appointed in and for each district for the term of four years, but shall be removable
from office at pleasure, whose duty it shall be to attend the district and circuit
courts when sitting therein, and also the Supreme Court in the district in which that
court shall sit.” 139 The provision fails to identify an appointing and removing
superior and certainly does not specify a court-based appointment mechanism. But
nor does it contemplate appointment by the district court judge. The phrasing of
the provision makes clear that marshals, although judicial servants in the sense that
they were duty-bound to execute the “lawful precepts” of the courts they attended
and perform other chores, were to be appointed by the President with the advice

disagreement (between the district and circuit judge), the presiding judge would have the
appointment. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, 5 Stat. 322, ch. 36, § 2 (declaring that “all the
circuit courts of the United States shall have the appointment of their own clerks”).
136 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76 § 7.
137 See JA 89, supra note , at § 1 (declaring that the supreme court shall consist of one chief
justice and five associate justices, and specifying the time and place of the court’s
sessions).
138 See, e.g.,
139 JA 89, supra note , at § 27. Deputy marshals were to be appointed by the marshal,
subject to removal from office “by the judge of the district court.” Interestingly, then, the
statute gives the president removal power over the marshals and the district judge removal
power over deputy marshals. Perhaps the drafters sought to give the judge some leverage
over deputies in case the marshal were to leave the office in charge of a deputy that the
judge deemed unfit to perform its duties. The choice of the “judge” as the party with the
removal power, rather than the “court,” suggests that the drafters did not view Article II’s
court-based appointment provision as a limit on the assignment of removal power.
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and consent of the Senate. And so they were. 140 As a consequence, the marshals’
office has long been viewed as a part of the executive branch of government, and
now operates within the Department of Justice.141 Far from disproving a consistent
practice of assigning judicial appointments to the court, rather than the judge, the
marshal provision actually confirms the drafters’ careful attention to matters of
form and structure. 142 In any case, later legislation carried on the pattern of vesting
the power to appoint judicial officers in the courts.143
Chief Justice John Jay played a central role in implementing the practice of
court-based, rather than Chief-based, appointment of inferior officers. In late
1789, shortly after it became generally known that he was to become the Chief
Justice, Jay was inundated with requests for patronage appointments that
proceeded on the assumption that he would make the appointments himself (in
keeping with the English model). For example, in one such letter, Theodore
Sedgwick (a member of the Massachusetts congressional delegation) apologized
for burdening Jay with a solicitation. But, Sedgwick explained, such applications
must frequently come “to men [like Jay] who have the power to confer offices.” 144
Fisher Ames made the same assumption, writing in November 1789 to recommend
an “eminently qualified” candidate “to your favor and patronage.”145 Even his

140

The marshal was expected to serve as the federal analog to the state sheriff, serving
writs and precepts, handling court funds and federal prisoners, and overseeing the federal
census operation in the district. For an account of the early history of the marshal’s office,
featuring a discussion of President Washington’s appointments, see Frederick S. Calhoun,
THE LAWMEN: UNITED STATES MARSHALS AND THEIR DEPUTIES, 1789-1989 (1989); David
S. Turk, A Brief Primer on the History of the U.S. Marshals Service, 55 Fed. Lawy. 26
(2008).
141 See 28 U.S.C. § 561 (a) (2006) (“There is hereby established a United States Marshals
Service as a bureau within the Department of Justice”).
142 The decision to assign the power to appoint (and remove) marshals to the president may
have reflected the conclusion that the execution of judgments was a matter for the
executive branch of government.
143 See Act of Feb. 28, 1799, 1 Stat. 626, ch. 19 § 7 (declaring the “respective courts of the
United States shall appoint criers for their courts, to be allowed the sum of two dollars per
day”); see also supra note (quoting the provision in the Act of Feb. 28, 1839 for the circuit
courts to appoint the court’s clerk).
144 See Letter from Sedgwick to Jay, Sept. 23, 1789, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note
, at 665.
145 See Letter from Ames to Jay, Nov. 10, 1789, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note , at
676.
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fellow Justice, William Cushing, wrote Jay to press the case of an applicant for the
clerkship position. 146
Jay’s response to these supplications was remarkable; he consistently
rejected the notion that he had the power to make the appointment himself and
insisted that the decision would be taken by the Court following consultation with
the Justices in attendance. Consider his reply to Fisher Ames:
There are at present several candidates for the place in question, and
probably the number will be increased before the appointment takes place.
As it should be the result of mutual information and joint consultation
between the judges, it appears to me proper that I should in the meantime
remain free from engagements, express or implied, to or for any
gentleman, however well recommended. 147
Jay said much the same thing in his reply to Justice Cushing:
I have made it a Rule to keep myself free from Engagements, and at
Liberty to vote as after mutual Consultation among the Judges shall appear
most adviseable. . . . There are several matters which will demand early
attention; and it would doubtless be useful to have some informal meetings
before Court, in order to consider and mature such measures as will then
become indispensable. 148
Jay’s sharpest remarks were directed to an acquaintance, John DuMott, who had
approached him for an office. Jay turned down the request, explaining
On these occasions it is best to be very explicit. It would neither be
friendly nor candid to excite delusory Expectations, or to make Promises
without a good Prospect of performing them. There is not a single office
in my Gift, nor do I recollect that there is more than one in the
appointment of the Court. As to offices in the Gift of other Departments I
think it my Duty not to interfere. 149

146

See Letter from Cushing to Jay, Nov. 18, 1789, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note ,
at 678-79.
147 Letter from Jay to Ames, Nov. 27, 1789, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note , at 680.
148
Letter from Jay to Cushing, Dec. 7, 1789, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note , at
682.
149 See Letter from Jay to DuMott, Feb. 27, 1790, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 2, supra note ,
at 696-97.
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In each instance, then, Jay rejected the assumption that offices in the judicial
branch were his to confer, and apparently did so because the Court was the
appointing agency and was to decide the matter after “joint consultation between
the judges.”
Looking to the official record of the actions taken by the Supreme Court
when it convened at the nation’s capital (New York City) in February 1790, we
find Chief Justice Jay was as good as his word. Although there was little judicial
business to do, 150 the Court did manage to appoint two inferior officers (a crier and
a clerk) and began to admit attorneys and counselors to practice before the bar of
the Court. The official minutes of the Court’s first two sessions include the
following entries:
Ordered, that Richard Wenman, be, and he is appointed Cryer of this
Court. 151
Ordered, that John Tucker, Esq. of Boston, be the Clerk of this Court.
That he reside, and keep his Office at the Seat of the National
Government, and that he do not practice either as an Attorney or a
Counsellor in this Court while he shall continue to be Clerk of the same. 152
Although a matter of routine, these two appointments provide important insights
into the Court’s own understanding of its appointment power. First, although the
Justices had met in advance about the clerkship appointment and settled on Tucker,
they nonetheless viewed themselves as duty-bound to formalize the appointment
by issuing an order in open court that would become a part of the official record. It
was not enough simply to send Tucker a letter of engagement or enter into a
handshake agreement. If the Court was to be the appointing agent, then the Court
was obliged to take action in accordance with the forms of law. The Justices’
decision to make an official appointment by court order helps to explain why they
took no action the first day, when the absence of a quorum prevented the Court as

150

Although the Court failed to muster a quorum on the first Monday of the month, a
fourth justice arrived and the Chief Justice proclaimed the Court open for business.
Newspaper reports suggest that the event was well attended by the leading statesmen of the
day, many of whom were already in town as members of Congress. The Court would not
docket its first case for several sessions and would not issue its first written opinion until
1792.
151 Fine minutes, Supreme Court of the United States, Feb. 2, 1790, reprinted in 1 DHSC,
pt. 1, supra note , at 175.
152 Id., Feb. 3, 1790, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note , at 175.
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such from conducting official business. 153 It also explains why the Justices
arranged to have a temporary clerk record the minutes of the actions taken before
the appointment of Tucker was formalized.154 By preserving minutes, the Court
would ensure that Tucker’s position would be both formally lawful and part of the
public record.
The Court’s appointment of the crier may be even more revealing. At the
time the Court acted, there was no statutory warrant for such an office. It had not
been created in the Judiciary Act and the Process and Compensation Acts similarly
omitted any mention of the office. 155 Indeed, it was not until 1799 that Congress
first authorized such a position, declaring that each court of the United States shall
appoint a crier and pay two dollars a day for his services. 156 That the 1790
appointment anticipated the statute by nine years suggests that the Justices took the
view that the Court enjoyed inherent power to hire personnel viewed as necessary
to the conduct of judicial business. 157 Apart from power to hire needed employees,
the appointment of the crier may shed additional light on the Court’s understanding
of the requirements of Article II. In appointing Tucker as clerk, after all, one
might understand the Court to have been following the lead of the Judiciary Act,
which defined the court as the appointing agency. In the absence of a statutory
directive, the Court’s formal action in appointing the crier may more clearly reflect
the Justices’ own view of the constitutional locus of the appointment power.
Whatever the crier’s significance for the debate over inherent powers, the
two appointments reveal a consistent commitment to a court-based appointment

153

Id., Feb. 1, 1790, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note _, at 171.
On the appointment of a temporary clerk, see 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra note , at 175 n.9
(noting that John McKesson acted as clerk on the first day the Court convened).
155 See An Act to Regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 93, ch. 21 §
2 (1789) (declaring that in suits at common law, the circuit and district courts were to
follow the writs, modes of execution, and rates of fees of the state courts in which they sat);
cf. An Act for Allowing Certain Compensation, Sep. 22, 1789, 1 Stat. 72, ch. 18 (setting
the salary of all federal judges and the attorney general of the United States but failing to
address the payment to such judicial officials as the clerk or the crier).
156 See Act of February 28, 1799, vol. 3, p. 133, § 7, as reprinted in Alfred Conklin, A
Treatise on the Organization and Jurisdiction of the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts of
the United States, 106 (Gould, Banks & Co. 1842)
157 For a careful assessment of inherent judicial authority, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The
Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735
(2001). Pushaw does not address the inherent power of courts to hire personnel viewed as
necessary to the conduct of judicial business, although he does acknowledge as a general
matter that courts can take action without legislative authority that they find essential to
carry out their judicial duties. Id at .
154

Court-Based Appointment of Inferior Officers

34

process. 158 The Court followed the practice of court-based appointments for
several years. Tucker resigned the clerk’s post after two years, forcing the Court to
find a replacement. The result of the search appears in an order published on
August 1, 1791:
Ordered, that Samuel Bayard be the Clerk of this Court in the place of
John Tucker Esquire of Boston resigned. 159
Bayard served for nine years, in part by appointing deputy clerks to perform the
office in his absence, and then resigned in 1800. 160 Even though Jay had long
since retired from his post as Chief Justice, the Court duly appointed Bayard’s
successor by entering an order to that effect in open court.161 Even today, the
power to appoint the Court’s clerk, librarian, reporter, and marshal remains in the
Court, rather than the Chief Justice. 162

158

Jay’s correspondence reveals that he viewed the appointments as matters for the court to
settle through consultation and deliberation among the Justices. We cannot reconstruct the
nature of the deliberative process but we do know that other candidates had been put
forward, that Tucker had strong support from Justice Cushing and from other leading
figures in Massachusetts politics, and that Tucker had served effectively as the clerk of the
Massachusetts supreme judicial court. We also know that Jay had advised Cushing that
candidates for the office should plan to attend the Court’s first session in New York.
Tucker, accordingly, was present in the courtroom. Jay’s correspondence does not reveal
anything about the Court’s internal deliberations. But however deferential he was to his
colleagues in the selection of the clerk and crier, he was obviously quite influential in
shaping the way the Court approached the appointment process. Rather than a judge-based
appointment process, Jay ensured that the Court itself played the official role as the
appointing agency.
159 Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 1, 1791, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra
note , at 192.
160 For an account of Bayard’s service as clerk and his reliance on deputy clerks, see 1
DHSC, pt. 1, supra note , at 162-63.
161 Fine Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 15, 1800, reprinted in 1 DHSC, pt. 1, supra
note , at 330-31(“Samuel Bayard having resigned the Office of Clerk of this Court. It is
Ordered that Elias B. Caldwell be appointed to the said Place.”). Jay resigned in 1795 to
become governor of New York. In 1800, Oliver Ellsworth was presiding as Chief Justice;
as a Senator from Connecticut, Ellsworth had played a lead role in drafting the Judiciary
Act of 1789.
162 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 671-74 (declaring that the Supreme Court may appoint officers to
serve as clerk, marshal, reporter, and librarian, and setting out the duties of such officials).
Congress first conferred power on the Court to appoint a reporter in 1817, vesting the
appointment power in the “Supreme Court.” Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 63, 3 Stat 376.
Power to appoint a marshal was first conferred on the Court in 1866. See Charles Fairman,
History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88,
pt. I, 167 (1971) (describing the adoption of the marshal provision).
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Efforts to switch to a Chief-based approach have not taken hold, at least
with the Court’s own clerk and marshal. Following his installation as Chief Justice
in December 1864, Salmon Chase developed draft language for inclusion in a bill
to reorganize the federal judiciary. 163 Among his suggestions was one that
provided: The “Chief Justice with the approval of the Court may appoint a
Marshal.” 164 When the issue came before the Senate, the proponent of the
language urged it as something the “judges” had suggested.165 Senator Reverdy
Johnson countered that he had never heard from the “judges” any complaint about
the existing practice of court-based appointment. 166 Others objected as well and
the provision was rejected. In the leading historical account of the episode,
Charles Fairman recounts the court-based system that Chief Justice Chase had
inherited and explains he proposed a switch to a Chief-based system because he
“had his own man in mind” for a bit of “patronage.”167 The Senate’s rejection of a
switch thus represents a modest vindication of the constitutional principle that the
appointments were to be the product of a consultative process with all of the
Justices in an effort to end the patronage-based appointment practices of the past.
E. The Drift to a Chief-Based Appointment Process
However consistent the early Court’s practice in making court-based
appointments of inferior judicial officers, such a practice did not necessarily
prevent district court judges from treating clerkship appointments as a source of
patronage. In an engaging history of the office of the district court clerk, Scott
Messinger reveals that the first clerk appointed in the District of Maine was the
nephew of the presiding judge. 168 Messinger also tells the story of Ex parte
163

Chase was confirmed as Chief Justice and took his seat in December 1864 as the Civil
War was winding down, filling the post vacated by Roger Taney’s death. With him on the
bench were a number of Justices appointed by Lincoln’s predecessors (Wayne, from
Georgia; Catron, from Tennessee; Nelson, from New York; Grier, from Pennsylvania; and
Clifford, from Maine). In addition, Chase had four Republic colleagues who had, like him,
been named to the bench by Lincoln (Swayne, Ohio; Miller, Iowa; Davis, Illinois; and
Field, California). For an account, see Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, pt. I, 1-4 (1971).
164 See Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88, pt. I, 167 (1971) (quoting language of section 2 of
the Chase draft).
165 Id. at 168-69.
166 Id. at 169.
167 Id. at 167, 171. See also John Niven, SALMON P. CHASE: A B IOGRAPHY 410 (1995)
(confirming that Chase wanted to secure the position for his close friend and associate
Richard Parsons)
168 See I. Scott Messinger, Order in the Courts: A History of the Federal Court Clerk’s
Office 1, 15 (2002) (noting that Henry Sewall, nephew of district court judge David
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Hennen, litigation that grew out of the decision of a newly appointed district judge
in Louisiana to replace the incumbent clerk with a friend. 169 In making the
appointment, the district judge admitted that he was acting, not out of concern with
Hennen’s abilities, but out of “feelings of kindness” for Winthrop, the new
appointee. 170 Although the former clerk sought a mandamus to compel his
continuation in office, at least as a circuit court clerk, the Court refused to issue the
writ. The Court confirmed that the clerk was one of the inferior officers
contemplated by the appointments clause of the Constitution, properly subject to
appointment by the courts of law. 171 But in the absence of any statutory guidance,
the Court simply presumed that clerks were removable at the will of the district
court and could claim no vested right in the office. 172
The judicial practice approved in Hennen, which reflects a close
identification of the district judge with the district court over which he presided,
may help to explain how judges rather than courts came to be seen as the
appointing authority for inferior judicial officers. Another factor in the evolution
away from a court-based appointment process may have been the need to empower
an official to act with reasonable dispatch in performing certain administrative
chores when the courts were unable to convene as such. In 1850, Congress
Sewall, was appointed as the first clerk of the District of Maine and describing other
patronage-based appointments in the nineteenth century culminating in an Act of Congress
that
forbade
nepotism)
(available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_03_01.html. Messinger reports that the
early clerks were paid out of the fees they collected from litigants, thereby producing some
of the same problems with fee-paid office and corruption that the framers had elsewhere
attempted to avoid. See id. at 8-12, 20 (describing the fee system and the discovery in 1818
that the district clerk in New York had embezzled over $100,000, apparently with the
connivance of the appointing judge). Eventually, in 1919, Congress placed the clerks on
salary. Id. at 44-45. For a survey of early compensation practices, see Thomas K. Urdahl,
The Fee System in the United States 122-33 (Madison, Democrat Printing Co. 1898).
169 See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230. At the time, the Judiciary Act provided that the clerk
of the district court was to be selected by that court and was also to serve as the clerk of the
circuit court. See supra note. The circuit judge preferred Hennen, the old clerk, and had
blocked the new clerk, Winthrop, from taking up circuit clerk duties. The Court’s rejection
of the mandamus petition left the district court in charge of choosing and removing the
clerk for both courts. Congress addressed the potential conflict by statute a short time later,
vesting power in the circuit court to appoint its own clerk. See Act of 1839, § 2, 5 Stat. 322
(declaring that all “circuit courts shall have the appointment of their own clerks” and
further providing in case of a division among the judges that the presiding judge shall make
the selection).
170 Messinger, supra note , at 17 (describing Judge Lawrence’s decision to replace Hennen
with Winthrop).
171 See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. at 258.
172 See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259.
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adopted legislation to staff the district courts when, by virtue of illness or
disability, the incumbent district judge was unable to do so. The mode chosen was
to allow either the circuit judge for the relevant circuit or the Chief Justice to
“designate and appoint” a district judge from an adjoining district to serve in the
disabled judge’s place. 173 A short time later, Congress broadened the authority of
the circuit judge and Chief Justice to allow them to designate adjoining district
judges to address the “accumulation or urgency of judicial business in any
district.” 174 At the time of the enactment, the Court’s term ran from the first
Monday in December, 1851 to May 27, 1852. 175 That left a substantial period of
time when the Justices of the Supreme Court were riding circuit and unable to
convene as a court to make an official designation.176
Another decisive step was taken towards a Chief-based process during
Reconstruction, as part of the Republicans’ desire to ensure the patronage-based
appointments of Republican office seekers. Thus, in the midst of Reconstruction
debates in early 1867, Congress found time to adopt a new bankruptcy law that
included a provision that called for the Chief to play a special role in the
appointment of the bankruptcy registers to assist the district courts. The provision
reads as follows:
That it shall be the duty of the judges of the district courts . . . to appoint in
each congressional district . . . , upon the nomination and recommendation of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, one or more
registers in bankruptcy, to assist the judge of the district court. 177
According to a leading account, Congress consulted with Chief Justice Chase
before adopting the provision and he failed to object, perhaps due in part to his
173

See Act of July 29, 1850, ch. 30, 9 Stat. 442 (authorizing circuit judge or Chief Justice
to “designate and appoint” a district judge from the same or an adjoining circuit to serve in
the place of the disabled judge).
174 See Act of April 2, 1852, ch. 20, 10 Stat. 5.
175
See Carl B. Swisher, 5 Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of
the United States: The Taney Period 1836-1874, 279, 284 (1974) (as there were no
statutory designations for term length or date, the Court took it upon itself to lengthen its
term in an effort to cope with its growing docket).
176
Prior to the 1850 and 1852 enactments, an 1848 legislative proposal to relieve the
Justices of all circuit responsibilities for a one-year period was rejected by the Senate. The
Acts of 1850 and 1852, supra notes 139-40, served as a “piecemeal attempt” to maintain
the circuit riding system while mollifying the overworked Justices. See Swisher, supra note
141, at 282-84.
177 Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 3, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch.
160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
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interest in controlling the patronage and in part to his desire to maintain good
relations with the Republican members of Congress. 178 But Chase was flooded
with petitions and delayed taking action in his new executive capacity while he
sought out the views of his brethren on the constitutionality of his new role.179
Eventually, he agreed to perform the function, adopting something of a straddle:
he would act, not as the appointing official, but would make nominations to the
district judge on which that judge was expected to exercise an uncertain degree of
independent judgment. 180
Apparently, it was this straddle that persuaded both Chase and Congress
that the Chief’s role was consistent with the constitutional requirement of a courtbased appointment. Indeed, Senator Roscoe Conkling defended the provision as
one that the House “very carefully” considered, and had upheld on the ground that
it entailed only nomination by the Chief rather than appointment. 181 It was true, as
a formal matter, that the appointment was to be made by the district judge. But
members of the Senate still raised questions. Senator Reverdy Johnson expressed
the following constitutional doubts:
“The Constitution provides . . . that Congress may . . . vest the
appointment of [inferior officers] in a head of a Department or in a
court. There is no authority to vest it in any individual member of a court; but
this clause, so far from vesting the appointment in the [district] courts . . . give
them merely a negative on the nomination of the Chief Justice.” 182

178

See Fairman, supra note , at 355-65 (recounting the episode and the consultation with
Chase, and criticizing Chase for having failed to resist the imposition of the appointive
role).
179 In a letter to his Republican colleague, Justice Miller, Chase expressed a willingness to
perform the duty, onerous as it was, so long as it was “not unconstitutional.” Fairman,
supra note , at 357.
180 Thus, in correspondence with the district judges, Chase described the action of the
district judge as “wholly independent of mine.” Fairman, supra note , at 365 n.211. He
also dissented from the doctrine that the district judges are “at all bound by the nomination
of the Chief Justice.” Id. But he also advised one recalcitrant district judge to reconsider
his decision to reject two of his nominees. Id.
181 Id. at 361.
182 Id. at 358 (quoting Senator Reverdy Johnson). A Democrat from Maryland, Senator
Johnson was among Congress’s most knowledgeable students of the Constitution. See
Harold M. Hyman & William M. Wiecek, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (1982). His dim view of Reconstruction was informed both by
his national political ambitions and his perception that it threatened to “subject the white
man to the absolute and unconditional dominion of an armed force of a colored race”).
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Others expressed practical concerns; how was the Chief to learn the qualifications
and reputation of local office seekers? 183 Thus, when Chase initially declined to
make any nominations, members of Senate unsuccessfully moved to repeal the
provision in part on constitutional grounds.
Whatever one’s view of the formal distinction between Chase as a
nominating official and the district court as the appointing entity, it appears quite
evident that Republicans designed the provision to ensure patronage-based
appointments. Chase was a newly appointed Republican justice, and known to
harbor presidential aspirations. Both of the alternatives -- the Court, with several
hold-over Justices from previous administrations, 184 and the district courts -- were
conceivably less well disposed to Republican office-seekers. 185 Assignment of a
controlling role in the process to the Chief could help to ensure the appointment of
loyal Republican bankruptcy registers, in a way that a more decentralized or courtbased process might not. 186 A major supporter of the legislation, Roscoe Conkling,
thus imagined that the Chief-based system would ensure a role for the party; the
Chief would not necessarily choose registers himself but could simply rely on the
House and Senate delegations from the relevant district to identify the designee,
thus transferring the value of the appointment to the local party apparatus.187
Although the Chief’s nominating power did not survive the repeal of the
bankruptcy law, 188 the Chief’s designation power took hold. Thus, the early

Robert J. Kaczorowsky, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts,
Department of Justice, and Civil Rights, 1866-1876 at 63 (1985).
183 Id. at 356 (quoting Senator Hendricks of Indiana).
184 See note supra (describing the ten-Justice Court of the day as including five Justices
appointed by previous administrations and five appointed by Lincoln).
185 See Fairman, supra note , at 355-56 (quoting Senator Fessenden for the proposition that
members of Congress supported the assignment of the appointment power to whatever
judge or court best aligned with “their way of thinking”). But as Fairman cogently
observes, it makes little difference which court actually makes the formal appointment if
the Chief has control of the nomination process. Id. at 356.
186 One defender of the legislation matter of factly assumed that the Chief would simply
follow the recommendations of the congressional delegation in making his nominations.
See Fairman, supra note , at 360 (quoting the comment of Senator Conkling). Eventually,
Chase did stand for the presidency, allowing his daughter Kate to manage his unsuccessful
candidacy for the presidential nomination of the Democratic (!) party. See John Niven,
Salmon P. Chase: A Study in Paradox 428-32.
187 See note supra.
188 The Act of 1867 was repealed in 1878; the next bankruptcy act, adopted in 1898, did
not contain the same appointment mechanism but instead assigned the power to appoint
referees in bankruptcy to the district courts they served. For an account, see Charles J.
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designation statutes from the 1850s provided a precedent on which Congress could
rely in creating the Commerce Court in 1910. 189 With President Taft in the White
House, pressing for the bill, Congress adopted legislation that created a special
court to test the legality and enforce the orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The law provided for the appointment of five Article III judges to
staggered five-year terms. Upon the conclusion of their Commerce terms, the
judges were to serve on regional circuit courts to which they were also
appointed. 190 The controversy arose from a provision that called upon the Chief to
appoint successor judges from other Article III courts to serve when the initial
five-year terms ended.
Members of Congress criticized this vesting of
appointment authority in a single person and argued that the Court should make the
appointment instead.191
While Congress later repealed the Commerce Court, the role of the Chief
in designating current Article III judges to serve on specialty courts has remained
very much alive. As Professor Ruger tells the story, Congress has created a series
of special tribunals and directed the Chief to staff them with judges drawn from the
ranks of current federal judges. These tribunals include the Emergency Court of
Appeals (1942-61), which heard appeals from the federal agency charged with
setting prices during World War II; the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(1968-present), which entertains motions to transfer related cases for consolidated
pre-trial proceedings before a single district court; the Special Division of the D.C.
Circuit (1978-2000), which appointed independent counsels and defined the scope
of their investigative authority under the terms of the Ethics in Government Act;
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review (1978present), which reviews Justice Department applications for national security
investigative warrants. As Professor Ruger aptly notes, Congress has apparently
come to regard Taft’s once-controversial model of Chief designation as “relatively

Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 3 Am. Bank. Inst. L. Rev.
5, 25 (1995) (citing Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 34, 30 Stat. 55).
189 See Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539. For an account of the Commerce
Court, describing its three year history and its disbandment by a disgruntled Congress, see
Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 939, 965-67 (2011); George E. Dix,
The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 238 (1964).
190 See 36 Stat. at 540.
191 See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at 561 (quoting Senators LaFollette and
Gore).
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unexceptional.” 192 In the next part, this Essay will evaluate the constitutionality of
Chief-based appointments.
III.

ASSESSING THE
APPOINTMENTS

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF

CHIEF-BASED

As we have seen, scholars who have examined the question believe that
the Chief’s appointment powers pass constitutional muster. For these scholars,
two factors -- the long history of chief-centered appointments and the perception
that the Chief acts for the Court in making appointments -- cast doubt on the claim
that Article II requires the Court to preside.193 In this part, I first set out the
elements of the affirmative case for a Court-based appointment requirement. The
second section of this part explores various elements of the defense of the Chief’s
role. The third section offers a few preliminary thoughts about how the Congress
and the Supreme Court could collaborate on a court-based appointment system
with relatively modest dislocation to current practice.
This Essay does not set out to advance any particular claim about the
theory of constitutional interpretation. Rather, drawing on the interpretive
modalities of Professor Bobbitt,194 the Essay relies on textual, structural, and
historical evidence, all of which points in much the same direction. Indeed, the
historical evidence tends to confirm that the framers of Article II were right to fear
patronage in creating a court-based appointment process. Rather than selling
offices for their personal account, the judges who have accepted a role in the
appointment process have chosen patronage of a different stripe. Just as the
district judge in Louisiana replaced his court’s clerk, Mr. Hennen, with a personal
friend, so too did Chief Justice Chase accept a congressionally conferred role in the
appointment process in part to help advance a partisan agenda. Critics of the
Chief’s role in subsequent years have worried, with varying degrees of candor, that
political considerations might inform the Chief’s selections. The clarity of the text,
192

Id. at 367.
See Ruger, Appointment Power, supra note 1, at __ (citing Freytag v. Commissioner,
501 U.S. 868 (1991)).
194 See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate:
Theory of the Constitution 9-119 (1982)
(elaborating six modalities of constitutional argument, including arguments from text,
structure, history, precedent, prudence, and ethos); cf. Akhil R. Amar, Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 29-89 (2000) (setting out the elements
of a “documentarian” approach to constitutional interpretation that nonetheless leaves
considerable room for arguments based on history, structure, and precedent); Akhil Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 750 n.9 (1999) (developing a distinctive brand of
text-centered interpretation but nonetheless celebrating Bobbitt’s interpretive modalities as
a “brilliant” contribution to the field).
193
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coupled with the continuing relevance of the discipline such a process would
impose, provide the basis for a strong argument in favor of a return to a courtbased approach to the appointment of inferior judicial officers.
A. Advancing a Court-Based Appointment Hypothesis
The formal case in favor of restricting the power of Congress to invest the
Chief with power to appoint inferior officers in the judicial branch flows directly
from the language of Article II. It provides that Congress can vest the appointment
of inferior officers in the president, in the heads of departments, or in the courts of
law. Because the Chief Justice is none of these, one might argue that Congress
cannot constitutionally vest the Chief with appointment powers. Such an account
gains strength from the considerations that emerged in part II. As the history
explored there reveals, the framers had reason to distinguish the Court from the
Chief in thinking about how to structure a public-regarding appointment process.
Moreover, the early practice of Congress and the Supreme Court appears to have
respected the Court’s appointing role. The case for a Court-centered appointment
practice thus finds support in the text, in the early institutional practice, and in a
functional account of the appointment process as a public trust.
The legislative precedents that led away from a Court-centered
appointment process help to underscore the wisdom of placing the power in the
courts of law, rather than the judges that staff them. To be sure, the motives that
underlay the provision for Chief-based nomination of bankruptcy registers differed
in important respects from the patronage concerns that animated the framers of
Article II. In the eighteenth century, the framers focused on the power of Chief
Judges to line their own pockets through the sale of offices to underlings. Such
sales tended to result in the multiplication of offices and an increase in the fees
associated with litigation. By the nineteenth century, patronage under the spoils
system provided the political parties with a way to reward loyal supporters with the
financial security of an office. Less well known, patronage also provided the party
with a source of funds to spend in the electoral process. Party loyalists who landed
jobs through the spoils system were expected to work for the party and to pay over
a portion of their salary to help underwrite the party machine.195 The choice of
Chief Justice Chase to nominate bankruptcy referees thus helped to ensure a new
set of officers from which the Republicans could demand political support and
195

See generally Ronald J. Hrebenar et al., Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Political
Campaigns (1999) (highlighting the importance of patronage in maintaining loyal party
workers and in filling party coffers); A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History
of American Political Parties (2000) (same).
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payola. While Chase was not selling the office of bankruptcy register for his own
account, his role surely enabled the Republican Party to extend its control over the
offices for patronage purposes. A court-based appointment process, either lodged
in the Supreme Court or in the district courts, would have been far less subject to
single-party capture.
Court-centered appointments also make sense in light of the hierarchical
nature of the federal judiciary, and the vesting of the judicial power in courts rather
than judges. Unlike Article II, which vests executive power in an individual (the
president), Article III vests the judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as Congress may ordain and establish. 196 (No power is vested in the
Chief Justice, other than that to preside in the Senate over impeachment trials of
the president.) Apart from the vesting of power in the Court, Article III imposes
requirements of unity, supremacy, and inferiority that place the Supreme Court
alone atop a judicial pyramid, with a wide variety of inferior courts and tribunals at
the base. 197 Recent scholarship suggests that such inferior courts and tribunals owe
a duty of obedience to the Court’s precedents and must remain subject to the
Court’s oversight and control. 198 Although it operates as a multi-member body,
then, the Supreme Court resembles the President in being constitutionally installed
as the head of one branch of the federal government.
The provision for appointment of inferior officers by the courts of law
complements this hierarchical structure by authorizing Congress to vest the
appointment power in the courts, both supreme and inferior, in which Article III
vests the judicial power. Such a provision maintains the Article III hierarchy; the
Supreme Court can make appointments of inferior officers and the lower courts
can make similar appointments. The Court’s decision in Ex parte Hennen suggests
that, at least in the absence of a contrary statutory prescription, such officers will
be subject to removal at the appointing court’s will, thereby ensuring that they
remain responsive to their appointing tribunal. While the Supreme Court cannot
necessarily discharge officers appointed by the lower courts, it can oversee the
196

See U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.
See generally Pfander, One Supreme Court, supra note __.
198 It was precisely this pyramidal conception of the Article III judiciary that the Scottishborn jurist James Wilson put forward in his 1791 lectures on the structure of the federal
judiciary. Recent scholarship, moreover, reveals that the Scottish judicial system on which
Wilson may have relied in drafting Article III featured the elements of supremacy and
inferiority that were included in the Constitution. Thus, the Scottish Court of Session was
proclaimed the supreme court and all other tribunals were required to remain subordinate to
the Session and to comply with its decisions. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 25, at 167477.
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work of those courts to ensure that they properly play their judicial role. The
choice of the courts as the recipient of the appointment power thus ensures that the
Court, declared supreme in Article III, will retain its role at the top of the judicial
hierarchy and will be in a position to oversee the work of any inferior officers it
appoints.
One can imagine at least three ways to defend the Chief’s role as the
depository of the appointment power. First, one might argue that Freytag treats
the Chief and the Court as equivalent for purposes of the appointment power.
Second, one might view the growing judicial bureaucracy as a separate
department, with the Chief Justice serving as its head. Third, one might question
whether at least some of the Chief’s appointees should be regarded as inferior
officers within the meaning of Article II. The next section explores these issues.
B. Testing the Court-Based Appointment Hypothesis
Scholars defend the appointment role of the Chief Justice as one that
enjoys the support of a lengthy pedigree, dating at least from the Progressive era.
But such an argument fails to take account of early practice. We have seen that the
framers of the Constitution likely provided for assignment of appointment powers
to the court, rather than the chief, to ensure a more transparent, publicly
accountable appointment process and to clarify that offices within the judicial
bureaucracy were not for sale. 199 Chief Justice Jay took pains to honor the spirit of
Article II by ensuring that the appointments of inferior officers were made in open
court. 200 Today, by contrast, the power to appoint such officers as the Director of
the Administrative Office has been statutorily assigned to the Chief Justice
alone. 201 The Court has no role to play, either in the appointment or removal
decision. As a practical matter, then, it seems quite difficult to characterize the
appointment practice as one in which the Chief acts for the Court in making
appointments.
Nor does Freytag v. Commissioner support an argument that the Chief
Justice should be deemed to act for the Supreme Court in making appointments.202
To be sure, the statute in Freytag authorized the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to
appoint special judges, and the Supreme Court upheld the statute after concluding
199

See supra pp.
See supra pp.
201 See 28 U.S.C. § 601 (defining the powers of the AO’s Director and providing that the
Director shall be “appointed and subject to removal by the Chief Justice of the United
States, after consulting with the Judicial Conference”).
202 See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
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that the Tax Court qualified as a court of law within the meaning of Article II. The
conclusion has helped to persuade scholars to equate the appointment power of a
court with that of its chief judge. But during oral argument in Freytag, the Court
was told that the Chief Judge of the Tax Court was selected for the position by the
other judges of the Tax Court, acting in their collective capacity. 203 As a result, the
Court decided Freytag on the assumption that the Chief Judge had been chosen by
the court itself. While one can plausibly read Freytag to uphold the chief judge’s
power to act as the court’s designee in appointing special judges, such a model
differs in important respects from that which obtains at the Supreme Court.
Appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief
does not owe his position as such to the Court. The Chief acts neither as the
Court’s agent nor pursuant to the Court’s oversight in performing the appointment
duties assigned to him by statute. 204
Apart from providing little support for current appointment practices of the
Chief Justice, Freytag may itself have been decisively re-shaped by the Court’s
later decision in Free Enterprise Fund. 205 In Free Enterprise, the Court
specifically adopted the view (advanced by Justice Scalia in his separate Freytag
203

During oral argument, one Justice inquired about the manner in which the Chief Judge
of the Tax Court was selected. Appearing for the government, Deputy Solicitor General
(and now Chief Justice) John Roberts explained that the Chief Judge is “elected by the
regular members” of the Court. But that presented a problem; the government had taken
the position in its brief that the appointment in question should be upheld by treating the
Chief Judge as the “head of a department” of the executive branch. But heads of
departments must, according to the theory that animated the government’s brief, be
appointed by and answer to the President, rather than to the members of a collegial body.
The Chief Judge was not a presidentially selected head, but as Roberts acknowledged was
more like the “head of a collegial body” or “a chairman.” Oral Argument at 57:29, Freytag
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_762. That may explain why the
Court was persuaded to treat the Tax Court as a court of law, as suggested in the
amicus brief of Erwin Griswold. Justice Scalia’s solution, rejected by the majority but
later embraced in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, was to limit
the Courts of Law to Article III courts, and to regard the multi-member Tax Court
itself as a department head. See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (quoting
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring).
204 Some scholars have suggested that Congress could alter the mode of the Chief’s
selection, proposing either a rotation based on seniority or a selection by the Court. See
Edward T. Swaine, Hail, No: Changing the Chief Justice, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1709 (2006)
(suggesting alternative modes for choosing the Chief Justice). Obviously, in the wake of
such a reconfiguration, the Chief Justice might be seen more as the Court’s designee than
as an independent actor.
205 See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. __
(2010).
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opinion) that a multi-member commission could be regarded as a department head
for purposes of being empowered to appoint inferior officers within the meaning of
Article II. 206 The Court also maintained that the SEC’s Chairman could be
regarded as acting for the commission in making appointments. 207 The Court
based this conclusion not on a presumed identity between the Chairman and the
Commission but on the nature of the Commission’s oversight and control of the
actions of its Chairman. The Free Enterprise Court thus suggests that the practical
quality of the multi-member body’s oversight, rather than a dogmatic presumption
of identity, will control the evaluation of when an officer acts for a board or
commission in making an appointment.
As an alternative to depicting the Chief as acting for the Court, one might
defend the Chief’s role by characterizing him as the head of a department.
Congress has occasionally set up new institutions and housed them within the
judicial branch even though they do not exercise the judicial power of the United
States and play no direct role in the adjudication of cases and controversies. Both
the Administrative Office of the US Courts and the Federal Judicial Center play
supportive roles in the administration of justice and both lack any direct
adjudicative role. 208 (Similarly, the U.S. Sentencing Commission operates within
Article III in performing the quasi-legislative task of fashioning sentencing
guidelines and does so without direct oversight by the Supreme Court.) One might
depict such agencies as comprising a department of judicial administration over
which Congress has installed the Chief as head. One might defend the Chief’s
appointment powers by drawing a distinction between his judicial role (acting as a
member of the Supreme Court) and his administrative responsibilities. 209 Congress
has often assigned extra-judicial duties to the Chief; heading the judicial
administration department could be regarded as such a duty.
Yet the depiction of the Chief as the head of a separate department of
judicial administration runs into two related difficulties. For starters, as Professor
Resnik’s scholarship shows, the Chief may have difficulty in maintaining clean
206

See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
207 So long as the Chairman made the appointments subject to the Commission’s oversight,
the Court agreed to treat the appointments as having been made by the Commission as the
head of a department. See Free Enterprise, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 n.13 (upholding the
Chairman’s appointments on the ground that they were made “subject to the approval of
the Commission”).
208 See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
209 See Ruger, Judicial Appointment, supra note 1, at n. 12 (referencing a thorough
collection of scholarly work regarding the Chief’s administrative duties).
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lines of separation between the two roles. 210 In a broader sense, one cannot easily
separate the work done by the Article III bureaucracy from the fundamental
judicial chore of resolving litigated disputes. Just as the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts lobbies Congress for new courthouses, new judgeships, and new
support personnel, 211 so too does the FJC provide educational and statistical
support to federal judges. The close connection of all this work to the judicial
function raises doubts about whether one can really maintain a sharp distinction
between what judges do and what their supporting administrators do. In the end,
everyone in the Third Branch works to advance the administration of justice.
Second, structural constitutional considerations cast doubt on Congress’s
ability to create a department of judicial administration and place the Chief Justice
at its head. Recent decisional law and scholarship tend to decry the prospect of a
“headless fourth branch” of government, 212 suggesting that any department of
judicial bureaucracy should be regarded as housed within one of the three
traditional branches. For reasons that Professor Resnik articulates, one has
difficulty in seeing how the work of judicial administration could be regarded as an
element of either the legislative or executive branches of government. 213 (Here, we
should distinguish the executive work of the marshal’s office from the work of
judicial support and administration.) But even if one were to imagine a department
of judicial administration within the executive branch, it’s far from clear that
Congress could place the Chief Justice at its head. Such a role would not conform
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See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
In 2011, AO Director James C. Duff and Judge Julia Gibbons, Judicial Conference
Budget Committee chair testified in front of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
Financial Services and General Government in support of the Judiciary’s budget request of
$7.3 billion. In addition to his prepared testimony, Director Duff commented. “The one
area where we could use additional help is in judgeships, particularly in areas of the
country that are very overworked.” See Judiciary Warns of Impact of Deep Cuts in 2012,
The Third Branch (Apr. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-0401/Judiciary_Warns_of_Impact_of_Deep_Cuts_in_2012.aspx. For a general introduction
to the AO, see supra note 3.
212 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1817 (2009)
(describing a “the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the Headless Fourth Branch”).
On the origins of the term, during FDR’s administration, see President's Comm. on Admin.
Mgmt., Report of the Committee with Studies of Administrative Management in the
Federal Government 40 (1937).
213 To be sure, the marshal’s service has long been housed in the executive branch,
indicating that nothing prevents Congress from making officers involved in the execution
of judicial decrees responsive to the executive branch of government. But the officers in
question answer through the chain of command that leads ultimately to the Department of
Justice and to the President. See note supra.
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to the hierarchical conception of the executive branch that animates the Court’s
recent decisions.
One finds a clear expression of these values of hierarchy and the chain of
command in the Court’s most recent application of the appointment clause of
Article II, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board. 214 There, the Court invalidated a provision of Sarbanes-Oxley, which had
doubly insulated members the newly created Public Accounting Oversight Board
from presidential oversight and removal from office. 215 More importantly for our
purposes, Free Enterprise Fund teaches important lessons about the appointment
implications of a hierarchical branch. On the Court’s view, the President’s
executive supremacy demands that he retain a measure of control over government
officers and thus invalidates restrictions that insulate such officers from removal.
Such invalidation was said to preserve what Madison described as the proper
“chain of dependence,” through which “the lowest officers, the middle grade, and
the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the
community.” 216
This hierarchical conception of the executive branch, culminating in the
President, helped to shape the Free Enterprise Court’s definition of a “department
head” for appointment purposes under Article II. In an intriguing feature of the
opinion, the Court held that the Securities and Exchange Commission – a multimember body – could qualify as a department head in which the power to appoint
inferior officers could be constitutionally vested. 217 As the Free Enterprise Court
214

130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
The provision in question vested power in the Securities and Exchange Commission, an
independent regulatory agency, to appoint members of the Board to staggered five-year
terms, subject to removal by the SEC for good cause. Ultimately, the Court held that the
insulation of Board members from presidential removal from office violated the
constitutional provision vesting executive power in the president. While the Court did not
question the power of Congress to vest executive power in an independent agency, such as
the SEC, whose members enjoy some insulation from presidential removal, the double
layer of insulation accorded members of the Board was deemed unconstitutional. As the
Court explained, the statute not only “protects Board members from removal except for
good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether that good cause
exists.” Id. at 3153.
216 Id. at 3155.
217 In viewing the Commission as a department head for appointment purposes, the Court
picked up a theme from Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Freytag, which had similarly
portrayed the multi-member Tax Court as the head of a department within the meaning of
Article II. As the Court observed, there was nothing particularly anomalous about viewing
a multi-member body as the appointing agency; it specifically noted the example of “courts
of law” in rejecting the notion that only an individual can make appointments under Article
215
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explained, “the Commission is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch,
not subordinate to or contained within any other such component, it constitutes a
‘Departmen[t]’ for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.”218 This definition
makes clear that department heads must answer, not to other officers in the Article
II hierarchy, but to the President as the chief executive.
Given this conception of department heads as answering to the President,
it’s not obvious how one could characterize the Chief Justice as a department head
within the executive branch. The Chief, to state the obvious, holds his commission
during good behavior. He does not report to, and cannot be removed from office
by, the President. To the extent department heads must answer to a constitutional
superior, then, the Chief plainly does not qualify.
Alternatively, one might portray the Chief as the head of an administrative
department within Article III, but such an argument poses problems of its own.
Article III’s vesting clause plays a role similar to that in Article II, vesting all of
the judicial power in the Supreme Court, and in lower federal courts, and requiring
all courts and tribunals to remain inferior to the one Court. Just as Article III may
well invalidate legislation that purports to place a lower court beyond the oversight
and control of its judicial superior,219 so too does Article III suggest that officers
working for the Third Branch should remain accountable to their judicial superiors.
Article II’s provision for appointment by the courts underscores this point. One
has difficulty seeing how the Chief could be said to be accountable to or dependent
on the Court in the exercise of his administrative duties. The Chief does not serve

II. Completing the thought, the Court observed that the organic act vested the SEC’s
powers, including the power to appoint Board members, in the Commission itself. On this
view, the Chairman was not to be viewed as the department head. Other commissioners
did not report to the Chairman and, unlike the Chairman who was appointed by the
president alone, Commissioners were installed in office through the usual mode of
nomination and Senate confirmation, thus qualifying the Commission as an agency head
within applicable law. In the end, the Court portrayed the Chairman as exercising
executive functions “subject to the full Commission’s policies,” rather than as a department
head, and upheld the Commission as the appointing department head on this basis.
218 Id. at 3163.
While the Court did not question the Commission’s dependence on the
President, it found that the statute’s insulation of the Commission’s appointees from at-will
removal broke the chain of dependence.
219 See Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note , at (contending that the Court’s supremacy
entails a power, not subject to congressional exceptions, to oversee the work of judicial
inferiors); Pfander, supra note , at (same).
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as the designee or elected representative of the Court itself, as in Freytag, and does
not submit his appointments to the Court for review and ratification.220
To be sure, not every government official involved in some way with the
administration of justice must answer to the Court. From the early years of
government, Congress placed the marshals outside the Article III hierarchy.
Marshals obviously play a role in the execution of judgments, serving process,
making arrests, and overseeing imprisonment and the execution of sentences. But
rather than providing for their appointments by the courts they serve, Congress
chose to vest the appointment of marshals in the executive branch of government
(following the model of the states in which the governor appoints local sheriffs).
Marshals today (with the exception of the Supreme Court’s own marshal service)
remain employees of the executive branch, housed in the Department of Justice, a
structure that reportedly creates tensions of its own.221 Whatever its wisdom, the
structure of the marshals’ service clearly complies with the “chain of dependence”
conception articulated in Free Enterprise Fund, with dependence running to the
President. The example of the marshals thus tells us little about Congress’s power
to set up a department within the judicial bureaucracy and place the Chief at its
head.
One might defend the current arrangement as a functional adaptation to the
growth and changing nature of the judicial bureaucracy or as a reflection of
constitutional-moment style legislation that embodies a fundamental change in the
constitutional order. 222 Chief Justice John Jay presided over a Court with only two
inferior officers, the crier and the clerk; court-based appointment did not impose a
220

Some scholars have argued that the Constitution does not necessarily vest the President
and Senate with the sole power to nominate and appoint the Chief Justice. These scholars
contend that Congress might create term limits for the Chief and provide for a rotation in
office among other members of the Court. See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at __.
Although this Article does not take a position on the constitutionality of such changes, they
could alter the Chief’s relationship to the Court and call for a reassessment of the Chief’s
appointive role.
221 See supra text accompanying note
222 The argument from functional adaptation recalls the familiar view that the Court should
not insist on strict adherence to the separation of powers, but should instead allow
adjustments over time. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding
assignment of judicial power to administrative agency and refusing to articulate
“formalistic and unbending rules”). For an account of adaptation, see Mark Tushnet,
Constitutional Workarounds, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1499 (2008) (proposing that Congress may
have power to work around certain inconvenient constitutional provisions, particularly
where the purpose underlying the provision has little continuing relevance). Of course, the
argument for the use of workarounds to facilitate adaptation has less force when the text in
question seeks to achieve a goal that remains relevant.
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significant burden on the Court or interfere with the Court’s primary function of
deciding cases. Today, the Administrative Office of the US Courts employs more
than 32,000 individuals at some 800 locations nationwide. 223 The sheer size of the
bureaucracy might seem to defy effective court-based oversight, especially for
Associate Justices who might prefer to avoid administrative chores. But the
argument from size and complexity does not necessarily argue for sole oversight
by the Chief; rather, it argues for delegation to a series of inferior officers who
remain responsive to their superior in the chain of command. Today, the director
of the Administrative Office serves as the chief administrative officer of the federal
courts and as the secretary to the Judicial Conference. Court-based selection of the
director would represent only a limited distraction for the Justices and would occur
only once every several years. 224
Constitutional-moment arguments owe much to the work of Bruce
Ackerman and his conception of the New Deal as a moment of engaged
lawmaking that effected a lasting change in the constitutional order, despite the
absence of any written constitutional amendment.225
Whatever of the
226
persuasiveness of Ackerman’s account of the New Deal, one cannot readily
identify a moment in the growth of the judicial bureaucracy that would qualify as
“constitutional” within the meaning of Ackerman’s model. Much of initial growth
in the judicial bureaucracy occurred during the Progressive era, under the
stewardship of Chief Justice Taft. 227 Further growth occurred in 1939, with the
creation of the Administrative Office.228 But even then, the Director of the Office

223

See
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/AdministrativeOff
ice.aspx (last visited June 1, 2012).
224 Since its inception in 1939, eight individuals have served as director of the
Administrative Office for an average term of nine years.
225 See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998) (describing
Reconstruction and the New Deal as periods of heightened citizen engagement and
unconventional higher law-making); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv.
L. Rev. 1737 (2007).
226 For criticisms, see John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703 (2002); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional
Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional
Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759, 768 (1992) (highlighting the problem of identifying when
such a moment has occurred and what content to ascribe to it).
227 See Ruger, supra note , at __ (describing the growth of the federal judicial bureaucracy
and the Chief’s appointment power).
228 See Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note , at __ (recounting the legislative impetus behind
the creation of the Administrative Office); Peter Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial
Administration (1973).
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was to be appointed by the Court. 229 It was not until 1990 that Congress altered
the appointment mechanism to vest the appointment power in the Chief.230 Rather
than a moment in which an aroused citizenry proclaimed a new era in judicial
administration (if indeed one can imagine such a thing), we have the drip-by-drip
accretion of authority that occurs when the relevant actors have lost sight of
constitutional limits.
C. Toward a Court-Based Appointment Process
Assuming that Congress cannot vest the Chief with power to appoint
inferior officers, but must vest the power in the Court instead, this section explores
the way Congress and the Court can work together to implement a model of courtbased appointment. Obviously, the most straightforward way to make the
transition would be to amend the relevant statutes and provide for the vesting of
appointment authority in the Court, rather than the Chief. Alternatively, the Court
could institute an internal practice of treating statutes that vest appointment power
in the Chief as if they meant to confer that power on the Chief as the Court’s agent.
In other words, the Chief and the Court could institute a practice of overseeing the
Chief’s appointments such that they could be properly regarded as the Court’s
work. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court noted that appointments by the
Chairman of the SEC could pass muster as appointments by the Commission itself
so long as the appointment “is made subject to the approval of the
Commission.” 231 Similar approval by the Court could help to address any
constitutional objection.
Such a modified appointment practice should not prove particularly
disruptive and it could nonetheless considerably improve the process. As
Professor Ruger has noted, judicial norms call for deliberation, consultation and
reason giving. 232 It appears that the decision of the framers to vest appointment
power in the Court, rather than the Chief, was meant to foster these consultative
values. Even though the Court did not give reasons for the appointment of John
Tucker as its first clerk, the Chief Justice took pains to ensure that the Court as
229

See Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223, ch. 15 § 302 (1939) (providing that the director
and assistant director of the Administrative Office shall be “appointed by the Supreme
Court of the United States and hold office at the pleasure of and be subject to removal by
the aforesaid Court”).
230 See Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 307, 104 Stat. 5112 (Dec. 1, 1990) codified at 28 U.S.C. §
601.
231 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 n.13.
232
On the importance of deliberation and collective decision-making, see Ruger, supra
note 1.
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such engaged in a joint deliberative process before announcing its decision. We
can assume that the deliberations focused on the relative merits of the candidates
and resulted in a consensus selection. Although it would be a drastic step, one can
imagine that a Justice, unpersuaded by the merits of a proposed appointee, might
file a short dissent, perhaps to highlight procedural concerns. In any case, the
prospect of group deliberation would impose an important discipline on the
appointment process, ensuring that the mix of candidates that the Chief put
forward for a particular post or posts would appeal broadly to the Justices.233
Shifting to a court-based appointment process might also improve the
legislative process by eliminating deliberations that focus on the politics or
personal character of the incumbent Chief. On at least three occasions, the identity
of the incumbent Chief appears to have played a role in the congressional
deliberations over how to vest the appointment power. First, in 1867, the political
affiliation of Chief Justice Chase appears to have persuaded the Republican
majority to give him a role in the selection of bankruptcy registers. 234 Later, in
1910, just one month before his death in July, the Senate focused on the fact that
Chief Justice Melvin Fuller would be exercising power to appoint replacement
judges to serve on the Commerce Court. Fuller was a genial person, but he
presided over a Supreme Court that had increasingly drawn the fire of
progressives. 235 Progressives sought to shift the appointment power from the
Chief to the Court, but critics of the proposed amendment criticized proponents for
casting aspersions on the current incumbent. 236 The identity of the Chief may have
also influenced Congress’s decision to establish a Special Division of the D.C.
233

For an intriguing echo of the argument that the process of appointment differs
significantly when an administrator submits proposed appointments to the oversight of a
larger group, see Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163 n.12 (observing in the context of
an inquiry into standing that the Court “cannot assume, however, that the Chairman would
have made the same appointments acting alone.”).
234 For an account, see text accompanying notes – supra.
235 Among the more notorious of the Fuller Court decisions, Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) had come down just a few years before the debate and had been the target
of focused progressive criticism. See Victoria Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The
Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 Cal. L.
Rev. 751, 779-81 (2009) (describing the galvanizing effect of Theodore Roosevelt’s 1910
attack on the Lochner decision). For a broader view of the Fuller Court, see Owen M. Fiss,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 18881910 (1993 Holmes Devise).
236 See 45 Cong. Rec. 7347, 7348, 7349, 7350 (June 3, 1910) (remarks of Senators Carter,
Bailey, and Hale on the subject whether the proposal to switch from the Chief to the Court
could be seen as an adverse “reflection” on Chief Justice Fuller); cf. id. at 7351 (remarks of
Senator Gore) (identifying Chief Justice Taney, author of the Dred Scott decision, as a
Chief who should not be trusted with the appointment power).
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Circuit to appoint the independent prosecutors specified in the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978. 237 Members of Congress close to that curious
appointment mechanism later explained that the decision to create the Special
Division was informed, at least in part, by a desire to avoid vesting Chief Justice
Burger with the power to choose an independent counsel and to place the power
instead in the hands of such D.C. Circuit judges as David Bazelon and Skelly
Wright. 238 If it were clear that the Court was to make these appointments, rather
than the Chief, Congress would have little occasion to debate the comparative
virtues of specific Chiefs or to create elaborate statutory workarounds.
Although one can predict that the Associate Justices would not welcome
the additional oversight role, the Court would have some flexibility in deciding
how far to press for court-based oversight of the Chief’s appointment role. The
Constitution requires the court to appoint inferior officers, but does not address the
appointment of employees. 239 In the Court’s view, officers are those who exercise
“significant authority” under the laws of the United States, while employees act as

237

The Ethics in Government Act authorized the Chief Justice to appoint three members of
the D.C. Circuit to serve on a Special Division that was, in turn, authorized to appoint
independent counsel and define the scope of their investigative power. On the
constitutionality of that appointment device, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(upholding the power of the Special Division to make appointments as a court of law, even
though the appointments in question were to positions in another branch of government).
238 See Letter from Abner J. Mikva to James E. Pfander, Jan. 2012, at 1 (confirming the
story that Democratic members of the House distrusted the Chief Justice and created a
Special Division in part to place the power to appoint independent counsel in other hands).
239 The inapplicability of Article II to the appointment of employees likely means that the
practice of permitting each Justice to appoint law clerks and other staff does not present a
constitutional problem. For an account of the practice, see Todd C. Peppers, Courtiers of
the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerks 42-4, 190205 (2006) (contrasting the role of law clerks as stenographers in the late nineteenth
century with their more expanded role on the Rehnquist Court). Some might argue that the
clerks now exercise real power in the decision of cases, both in recommending action to
their Justices and, through the cert. pool, in shaping the Court’s docket. See, e.g., Craig S.
Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78 G.W.
L. Rev. 1255 (2010) (arguing that Congress should strip the Court of its law clerks and
force the Justices to do their own work). But the law clerks propose and the Justices
dispose, making it hard to argue that the clerks occupy inferior offices that require fullCourt participation in the appointment process. Notably, the first Justices to hire law clerks
paid for them out of their own pocket, a fact that tends to support their characterization as
employees rather than inferior officers. See Melvin Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and His
Clerks, 49 U. Louis. L. Rev. 163, 165 (2010) (recounting the practice of Horace Gray, the
first Justice to hire a law clerk).
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“lesser functionaries” pursuant to the oversight of officers. 240 While the line can
be a bit unclear, 241 the Court can obviously refrain from playing any role in the
appointment of lesser functionaries. Established law pretty clearly establishes the
clerk of the supreme and district courts as inferior officers; the Court treated its
clerk as such and the decision in Ex parte Hennen so regards the clerks of the
district courts. 242 In addition, the Court held that special judges of the Tax Court
were inferior officers within the meaning of Article II as are the members of the
Public Accounting Oversight Board that figured in the Free Enterprise Fund
decision. 243 Presumably, such precedents suffice to establish that prominent
figures in the judicial bureaucracy, such as the Director of the Administrative
Office, qualify as inferior officers for whom court-based appointment should be
the norm. Hiring practices at lower levels in the bureaucracy need not change.
As with employees, the Court’s appointment obligations would not
necessarily extend to decisions about how to designate judges for special judicial
service. Here, one must distinguish between the initial appointment of Article III
judges, which has conventionally been thought to require Presidential nomination
and Senatorial advice and consent, and the designation of current Article III judges
to play a special role within the judicial branch. (Some scholars have contended
that lower court judges could be regarded as inferior officers, as befits their status
as the judges of inferior courts. If adopted, such a view could presumably clear the
way for the appointment of inferior federal judges by the Court itself, as Professor
Burke Shartel contended some years ago. 244) Such designation of existing judges
does not obviously entail the appointment of a new inferior (or principal) officer.
After all, the judicial office as understood today includes both the adjudication of
240

Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160. The Court put it this way in a leading
statement:
[I]n the context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to
important government assignments, we think it evident that “inferior officers” are
officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were
appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
241 Thus, the Court acknowledged that the status of administrative law judges, officer or
employee, remains a matter of dispute. See id. at 3160 n.10.
242 See supra text accompanying note
243 See supra text accompanying note
244 See Burke Shartel, Federal Judges--Appointment, Supervision, and Removal--Some
Possibilities under the Constitution, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 870 (1930) (arguing that one might
characterize lower court judges as inferior officers within the meaning of Article II, thereby
clearing the way for their appointment by the Supreme Court).
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cases and controversies as a member of a specified court, and the performance of
additional tasks in accordance with proper designations. Such additional tasks, as
we have seen, could potentially include service on a wide range of Judicial
Conference committees as well as service on a court of specialized jurisdiction.
Rather than filling offices, the Chief’s designation of judges might well be viewed
as specifying what immediate duties, out of a range of possibilities, the judge
should perform. 245
This conception of designation conforms to early practice under the 1850
statute that first conferred power on the Chief Justice to identify a judge from an
adjoining district to assist in the case of judicial disability. There, Congress
specifically conferred on the Chief the power to “designate and appoint” a judge
for the purpose. 246 But it was clearly understood that the Chief was to select from
among current Article III judges in making the designation, rather than to appoint
new judges to provide assistance. Similarly, when Congress returned to
designation in the creation of a Commerce Court in 1910, the initial appointment
of judges was to be made by the President and the Senate; the Chief’s designation
came into play only after the initial five-year term for initial appointees had run its
course. 247 In both cases, the designation mechanism relied on initial Presidential
appointment and authorized the Chief to assign existing Article III judges to the
positions in question. Designation may thus be best understood as specifying the
work of an Article III judge, rather than as the appointment of an inferior officer.
On this basis, the Court might well leave intact a wide range of designation
authority now exercised by the Chief.248

245

Congress can impose new duties on an existing officer without running afoul of Article
II, so long as the new duties can be considered “germane” to the work already being
performed by that official. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 171-75 (1994);
Shoemaker v. United States, 147 282, 300-01 (1893). It follows a fortiori that the
designation of particular duties from an established range would not present appointment
clause problems.
246
See supra text accompanying note 169.
247
See supra text accompanying note 173.
248 On the other hand, the simple fact that the Chief designates a sitting Article III judge to
fill an available post does not necessarily address all concerns. It strikes me as relatively
easy to maintain that specialized judicial work, such as that on the Judicial Panel for
Multidistrict Litigation, represents simply one more element of the core judicial
responsibility of adjudicating cases and controversies. But some designations, such as
those of sitting judges to serve as Director of the AO or FJC, see note supra, would
occasion a marked departure from the business of adjudication. In taking up the new task,
the Director more closely resembles an officer with new executive responsibilities than a
judge on temporary assignment to a new judicial venue.
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The Court’s deference to the Chief’s designation of judges might extend to
such specialized courts as the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and the
FISA courts. To be sure, judges designated for service on such courts exercise the
judicial power of the United States, performing the core work of overseeing the
resolution of cases and controversies. In that sense, their designation does not
differ from other designations, such as those to address disabilities or temporary
workload dislocations. On the other hand, designation to a specialized court poses
a risk that the Chief will be perceived as staffing the court with judges who favor a
certain approach to the legal questions likely to come before the tribunal. Critics
have suggested, for example, that Chiefs in the past have favored relatively
conservative designees for the FISA court, Republican judges for the Special
Division, and judges open to procedural reform for the civil rules committee. 249 A
collegial designation process would go far to blunt such criticisms.
One final challenge lies in drawing the line between offices to which the
Chief can make designations and those to which he makes new appointments.
Obviously, deliberations at the Court could help to inform this line-drawing
puzzle. But at least two factors might help to distinguish designative offices,
which the Chief can fill alone, from appointive offices. If the office requires the
exercise of judicial power and can only be filled by an Article III judge, the
argument for treating it as a designation seems relatively straightforward. If
Article III judges and others can both serve in an office, such as a membership on
the civil rules advisory committee or the directorship of the Administrative Office,
then the argument for regarding the appointment as a mere designation seems
harder to sustain. If the office entails the exercise of law or policy-making power,
then the argument for regarding it as the sort of inferior office that the Court itself
must oversee becomes harder to resist.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Chief Justice Jay’s scrupulous adherence to a court-based appointment
model sharply contrasts with a modern practice that treats the Chief as the
presumptive appointing authority. Like many functional adaptations to the growth
of the federal government, the Chief’s new role as the head of a judicial
bureaucracy has its defenders. One can certainly sympathize with arguments from
administrative efficiency, and can predict that the Court might not welcome the
burden of sharing the Chief’s administrative portfolio. Yet the Court’s own
decisions refuse to allow arguments from convenience to trump the lines of
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accountability sketched out in the Constitution’s appointment provisions. As the
Court recently reaffirmed, ‘[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.’ ” 250
It seems likely that the courts were installed as the appointing entity to put
fences around the patronage power of chief judges and to ensure that offices were
to be viewed as part of a public trust for distribution on the basis of merit after due
consultation. Granted, we do not need to police judicial branch appointments to
ensure democratic accountability; the people play at best an indirect role in the
choice of the Article III judiciary and the exercise of the judicial power. Yet a
growing body of evidence suggests that hierarchy played an important role in the
structure of the federal judiciary, with one Supreme Court sitting atop a federal
judicial pyramid. While no one would insist that the Court adjudicate every case
or controversy or approve every appointment in the Third Branch, the structural
imperatives of hierarchy call for the Court to participate in or oversee adjudication
and significant appointment decisions involving inferior officers. Such oversight
would honor the Court’s supremacy and the Article II provision for appointments
by the “courts of law.”
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